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Abstract
This Comment argues that by adopting a two-stage common maritime policy, with a gradual
liberalization of cabotage, the European Community took the right course of action in view of the
prevailing internal and international conditions of the maritime market. Part I defines the basic
concepts concerning the maritime industry and policy. Part I also presents the legal framework
within which the European Community adopts measures on maritime policy. Part II discusses the
1986 Legislative Package, marking the first stage in the development of the Community common
maritime policy. Part II then reviews the provisions and impact of Regulation 3577/92 which
continued and complemented the development of the EC common shipping policy initiated by
the 1986 Legislative Package. Part III maintains that the European Community has succeeded in
establishing a common maritime policy, leading not only to the full liberalization of maritime trade
between Member States and among Member States and third countries, but also, to the gradual
opening up of cabotage routes. Part III further maintains that by tackling the external and internal
issues confronting the EC maritime policy separately and in stages, the European Community has
acted in its best long-term commercial and strategic interests. This Comment concludes that the
European Community has successfully forged a common maritime policy as one of the vehicles
towards achieving the single internal market.

CABOTAGE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COMMON
MARITIME POLICY: MOVING TOWARDS FREE
PROVISION OF SERVICES IN MARITIME
TRANSPORT
Rossina Petrova*
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1957, the European Community1
2
("EC" or "Community") has become a leading economic power,
with a significant share of the world's commercial exchange. 3
The majority of EC trade is still carried out by sea.4 Recent
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University. I dedicate this Comment to Marius,
for his unconditional love and support in all my endeavors.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by
Single European Act [hereinafter SEA], O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741, in
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). As of
the signing of the TEU, the term European Community ("EC" or "Community") replaces the term European Economic Community ("EEC"). TEU, supra, art. G, O.J. C
224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728; P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN
UNION LAw 4 (1995). In addition to the EEC, there is the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC") and the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom"). Id.
The TEU established the European Union, which functions as a new chapter in the task
of uniting the people of Europe more closely. Id. at 3-4. The EEC, ECSC, and Euratom
comprise the first of the three pillars that form the European Union, while the second
and third pillars are, respectively, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Co-operation in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs. Id. at 4. The twelve Member States that
signed the TEU were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. TEU, supra,
pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 719. In 1995, Austria, Finland,
and Sweden acceded to the European Union. Roger J. Goebel, The European Union
Grows: the ConstitutionalImpact of the Accession ofAustria, Finlandand Sweden, 18 FoRDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1092, 1093 (1995).
2. See Rosa Greaves, EC Maritime TransportPolicy and Regulation, 3 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 119, 119 (1992) (noting position of European Community as major economic
power).
3. See ANNA BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU &JOHN TZOANNOS, THE COMMON SHIPPING Po.ICY OF THE EC 115-16 (1990) (reviewing Community's share of world imports and ex-

ports for 1982). The Community's trade with third countries in 1982 represented 21%
by value of world imports and 20% of world exports. Id. By comparison, the share of
the United States, the second leading trading power, for the same period amounted to
16% of world imports and 10% of world exports. Id.
4. See Commission of the European Communities, Shaping Europe's Maritime Future; A Contribution to the Competitiveness of Maritime Industries: Communication
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figures show that ninety percent of external trade and thirty percent of intra-Community trade rely on maritime5 transport.6 It is
of primary importance for the European Community, therefore,
to maintain a viable and competitive commercial fleet.7
The EC maritime industry8 has not been able, however, to
avert the adverse effects of the prolonged crisis in international
shipping9 and the steady growth of the fleets of developing countries.10 Compared with the fleets of the developing countries,
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (96) 84 Final at 3-5 (March
1996) [hereinafter Commission Communication I] (assessing importance of transport
by sea for Community economy).
5. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 968 (6th ed. 1990) (defining maritime as pertaining to navigable waters, such as sea, ocean, great lakes, navigable rivers, or to navigation
or commerce on navigable waters).
6. See Commission Communication I, supra note 4, COM (96) 84 Final, at 3 (explaining role of maritime transport).
7. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 119-20 (discussing importance of maintaining viable and competitive Community fleet).
8. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 12 (identifying maritime
industry as carriage of goods and passengers by "vessels over the surface of water."). See
also COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO SHIPPING, CHAIRMAN:

THE RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT

ROCHDALE, REPORT, 1970, Cmnd 4337, at 1 [hereinafter ROCHDALE REPORT] (defining
EC maritime industry as transporting goods and persons in ships from "a dockside
point across the sea for commercial return.").
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1378 (defining shipping as putting,
or receiving, on board ships or vessels intended for navigation).
10. See MULTINATIONALS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Krishna Kumar & Maxwell
G. McLeod eds., 1981) (identifying developing countries or nations as "all nonsocialist
nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America that are not the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD")."). The Convention setting up the OECD was signed in Paris on December 14, 1960 by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Irish Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States of America. See Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. Japan became a member in 1964, Finland in 1969, Australia in 1971, New
Zealand in 1973, Mexico in 1994, the Czech Republic in 1995, and Hungary, Poland,
and the Republic of Korea in 1996. OECD, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS 2 (1997). The purpose of OECD is to promote policies designed:
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and
a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial
stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in member as well as nonmember countries in the process of economic development; and
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
Id. art. 1, 888 U.N.T.S. at 183. See also ADEMUNI-ODEKE, PROTECTIONISM AND THE FUTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 3 (1984) [hereinafter PROTECTIONISM] (describing general
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the Community commercial fleets have suffered a decrease in
their competitiveness and strength on the world maritime market. l a The EC fleets experienced a considerable decline both in
terms of tonnage 12 and total size relative to other principal world
fleets i3 in the period between 1970 and 1987.14 A strong nashipping industry decline and growing fleets of developing countries); Commission of
the European Communities, Towards a New Maritime Strategy: Communication from
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (96) 81 Final, at 1 (March 1996)
[hereinafter Commission Communication II] (discussing shrinking EC shipping industry in contrast to growing shipping industries of developing countries, particularly in
East Asia).
11. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 7-30 (comparing
growth of combined EC fleets with world total growth of fleets, and growth of fleets in
different world regions for period between 1970 and 1987). In 1970, the number of
ships of the combined EC fleets comprised 33% of the world total. Id. at 17 tbl.2.1. In
1975, that percentage went down to 27.6. Id. In 1980, the percentage was 24.4. Id. In
1987, the percentage dropped to 19.3, and in 1987, it went down to 18.3. Id. By contrast, while the number of ships of the combined fleets of the developing countries
comprised 19.15% of the world total in 1970, that percentage went up to 25.5 in 1975,
to 31.15 in 1980, to 38.3 in 1986, and it grew to 39.1 in 1987. Id.
12. Id. Tonnage is measured by the gross registered tons. Id. See 11 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPeDIA BRITANNICA 843 (15th ed. 1994) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPODIA BRITAN-

NICA] (defining tonnage as total number of tons registered or carried, or total carrying
capacity of ship). Gross tonnage is "a measurement of total capacity expressed in volumetric tons of 100 cubic feet." Id. In 1970, the combined EC fleets represented 31.9%
of the world total, by tonnage. BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 18
tbl.2.2. That percentage went down to 30.23 in 1975, to 28.7 in 1980, to 19.1 in 1986,
and in 1987, the percentage dropped to 16.5. Id. At the same time, the combined
fleets of the developing countries increased their tonnage as a percentage of the world
total tonnage from 25.9 in 1970 to 33.9 in 1975, to 40.4 in 1980, to 51.2 in 1986, and in
1987, the percentage reached 54.8. Id.
13. See Statistical Tables in Lloyd's Register of Shipping for the periods between
1970-1987, reprinted in BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 17-18 (reviewing capacity of principal world merchant fleets between 1970 and 1987). In the
1970s and 1980s, Lloyd's Register of Shipping classified the world's major fleets into
five groups. Id. The five groups included the EC, the OECD,the Eastern Bloc, the Far
East, and Open Registries. Id. Until 1995, the EC Member States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Irish Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. TEU, supra note 1, pmbl., O.J. C 224/
1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725-26. The Eastern Bloc countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Vietnam. BREmMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 7. The countries of the Far East were the People's Republic of China, Hong-Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. Id. Open-registry
countries included Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, Liberia, Panama, and the Somali Republic. Id.; ALAN W. CAFRUNY, RULING THE WAVES 91 (1987) (explaining that open

registries are registries of countries whose laws allow registration of ships owned by
foreign nationals or companies). The practice of allowing a foreign ship to fly the open
registry country's flag contrasts with the practice of most countries, where the right to
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tional fleet means not only an efficient and competitive maritime trade and brisk economy.' 5 Shipping fleets are also status
symbols.' 6 If the European Community wants to retain its prestige and status as a leading economic power, it must maintain a
strong modern fleet.' 7
Free access to maritime services within Member States
presents one of the factors contributing to the vitality and competitiveness of the Community fleet.' 8 Moreover, the removal of
restrictions on the provision of services along cabotage' 9 routes
within Member States will eliminate another barrier towards establishing the internal market 2° as an area of free movement of
fly the national flag is subject to stringent conditions. Id.; see H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 133-34 (1967) (clarifying that ships fly flag of state of their nationality as
symbol and evidence of their nationality). Flying the flag of a state thus means having
that state's nationality. Id. A state is under the obligation to ensure that those who sail
under its flag comply with the treaties and other international rules by which that state
is bound. Id. at 6; see ROBERT P. GRIME, SHIPPING LAw 18 (1978) (pointing out that "[a]
ship that is registered in a particular State flies the flag of that State and is subject to the
laws of that State."). Registration on open registries is also known as flag of convenience. CAFRUNY, supra, at 91. The major reasons for acquiring a flag of convenience is
to avoid taxation in the shipowner's own state and to bypass more stringent safety, requirements of the shipowner's own state. See EDGAR GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT: THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MARINE POLICY AND SHIPPING LAw 268 (1981) (explaining
motivation for adopting flag of convenience); C. JOHN COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw OF THE SEA 387 (1967) (noting that principle motive for acquiring flag of convenience lies in avoidance of taxation and reduction of operational costs through lower
crew wages).
14. BREDIMA-SAvoPouLou & TzOANNOs, supra note 3, at 7-12.
15. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 119-20 (emphasizing role of maritime industry for
Community's economic power and prestige).
16. Id.; CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 1 (characterizing merchant shipping as "an instrument of national security and self-determination.").
17. Id.
18. See id. at 119-27 (discussing EC maritime transport through early 1990s and
need for full liberalization of maritime services for carriage of goods and passengers to,
within, and from Community).
19. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 310 (3rd ed. 1986) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY] (defining

cabotage as trade or transport in coastal waters or between two points within single
country, or as restriction of right to trade and navigation in coastal waters to domestic
carriers).
20. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (asserting that
European Community shall have as its task establishment of a common market and that
common market shall provide major framework for Community activities); id. art. 3,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (stating that Community activities shall include "an internal
market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.").
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goods, persons, services, and capital. 21 The full liberalization of
maritime trarisport both with respect to intra-Community services and services between Member States and third countries can
only be achieved within the framework of a Common Transport
Policy. 22 In 1986, the Council of Ministers2 ("Council")
adopted a package of four regulations 24 ("1986 Legislative Package"). The 1986 Legislative Package marked the first stage in
the implementation of an EC common maritime transport policy. 25 Council Regulation 3577/92,26 extending the principle of
freedom to provide services to maritime cabotage, marked the
second stage towards a common maritime policy. 27 For years the
21. See Council Regulation No. 3577/92, pmbl., O.J. L 364/7
(1992) [hereinafter
Regulation 3577/92] (applying principle of freedom to provide services to maritime
transport within Member States as means of establishing internal market that "will comprise an area in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured.").
22. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 61 (1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617 (stating that
freedom to provide services in the transport field "shall be governed by the provisions
of the Title relating to transport."). Because Article 61 (1) makes the freedom to provide transport services subject to the rules of Articles 74-84 governing transport, free
provision of services in this sector can only be implemented through the introduction
of a Common Transport Policy by means of legislative acts adopted by the Council of
Ministers ("Council"). Greaves, supra note 2, at 122. The Council functions as a Community legislative body. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EuRoPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 51 (1993). The Council consists of representatives of each Member State at ministerial level. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 146, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
679. See also id. arts. 145-54, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82 (describing composition and
functions of Council).
23. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 145-54, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82 (setting
forth duties and composition of Council). The Council acts as a legislative body. BERMANN,

supra note 22, at 51.

24. See Council Regulation No. 4055/86, OJ. L 378/1 (1986) [hereinafter Regulation 4055/86] (applying principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport
between member states and third countries); Council Regulation No. 4056/86, O.J. L
378/4 (1986) [hereinafter Regulation 4056/86] (detailing rules for application of
Treaty Articles 85 and 86 on competition to maritime transport); Council Regulation
No. 4057/86, OJ. L 378/14 (1986) [hereinafter Regulation 4057/86] (restricting unfair pricing practices in maritime transport); and Council Regulation No. 4058/86, OJ.
L 378/21 (1986) [hereinafter Regulation 4058/86] (concerning coordinated action to
safeguard free access to cargoes in ocean trades). The four regulations comprise the
1986 Legislative Package ("1986 Legislative Package"). Commission Communication II,
supra note 10, COM (96) 81 Final, at 8 n.3.
25. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 128-38 (describing cabotage as a problem 1986
Legislative Package did not address and referring to pending legislative proposals on
issue of cabotage).
26. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, O.J. L 364/7 (1992).
27. See Commission Communication II, supra note 10, COM (96) 81 Final, at 8-11
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Council deliberated Regulation 3577/92,28 and even after its
adoption, Regulation 3577/92 represented a delicate compro29
mise between opposing positions taken by Member States.
This Comment argues that by adopting a two-stage common
maritime policy, with a gradual liberalization of cabotage, the
European Community took the right course of action in view of
the prevailing internal and international conditions of the maritime market. Part I defines the basic concepts concerning the
maritime industry and policy. Part I also presents the legal
framework within which the European Community adopts measures on maritime policy. Part II discusses the 1986 Legislative
Package, marking the first stage in the development of the Community common maritime policy. Part II then reviews the provisions and impact of Regulation 3577/92 which continued and
complemented the development of the EC common shipping
policy initiated by the 1986 Legislative Package. Part III maintains that the European Community has succeeded in establishing a common maritime policy, leading not only to the full liberalization of maritime trade between Member States and between
Member States and third countries, but, also, to the gradual
opening up of cabotage routes. Part III further maintains that
by tackling the external and internal issues confronting the EC
maritime policy separately and in stages, the European Commu(analyzing 1986 Legislative Package and Regulation 3577/92 as Community measures
striving to create single maritime market).
28. See Commission of the European Communities, Implementation of Regulation
3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport
within Member States - 1993-1994: Report from the Commission to the Council, COM
(95) 383 Final, at I (September 1995) [hereinafter Commission Report I] (noting difficulty in reaching agreement between positions of Northern and Southern Member
States). See also BPEDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 157-59 (discussing
deliberations of Council of Transport Ministers leading to 1986 Legislative Package,
and Southern Member States' opposition to Northern Member States' insistence on
immediate lifting of cabotage restrictions).
29. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6, O.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992) (allowing for gradual phasing out of existing cabotage restrictions along coasts of Southern Member States). In view of the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the Southern Member States, Regulation 3577/92 gave those States time and opportunity to adjust their shipping industries to the new regime of free access to cabotage routes within
Member States. See Commission of the European Communities, Implementation of
Council Regulation 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to
maritime cabotage (1995-1996) and on the economic and social impact of the liberalization of island cabotage: Report from the Commission to the Council, COM (97) 296
Final, at 20-26 (June 1997) [hereinafter Commission Report II] (assessing socio-economic impact of liberalization of cabotage on Northern and Southern Member States).
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nity has acted in its best long-term commercial and strategic interests. This Comment concludes that the European Community has successfully forged a common maritime policy as one of
the vehicles towards achieving the single internal market.
I. MARITIME INDUSTRY AD POLICY, AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR EC MARITIME POLICY
The maritime industry is an international industry ° concerned with the shipping of passengers and goods over navigable
waters.3 1 Because of its close ties with international trade,3 2 shipping plays a major role in the economy and political relations of
a state.33 The Community's power to legislate in the sphere of
34
maritime transport derives from Aiticle '84(2) of the EC Treaty.
EC action in the maritime transport area must also observe the
general EC Treaty rules of nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality,35 freedom to provide services, 6 and competition.3 7
30. See NAGENDRA SINGH, MARITIME FLAG AND INTERNATIONAL LAW xiii
(1978) (describing international character of shipping industry); GIME, supra note 13,
at I (noting inevitable international element in shipping activities, "since ships and
cargoes, by nature, travel between countries."); ADEMUNI-c)DEKE, SHIPPING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE RELATIONS 3 (1988) [hereinafter SHIPPING] (referring to international
nature of shipping industry).
31. See BLACK's LAw DICrIoNARY, supra note 5, at 968 (defining maritime as pertaining to navigable waters, or to commerce on navigable waters).
32. See SHIPPING supra note 30, at 3-6 (describing close interdependence of international trade and shipping services); ROCHOALE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that
"[m]ost of the [shipping] industry's business is concerned with international trade.");
CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 2 (referring to shipping as constituting "operations of the
global marketplace for the transportation of commodities.").
33. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at I (stating that "[a]s a basic infrastructure of
international trade, shipping is a key source of power in world politics" and describing
industry as "an independent producer of wealth, an important lever of national economic development, and a crucial element of military power."); SINGH, supra note 30, at
xiii (pointing out overall commercial importance of shipping industry and intimate
relation "between the attributes of national sovereignty.., and economic interests involved in the maintenance" of shipping services).
34. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (granting
Council power to lay down provisions for sea transport); Greaves, supra note 2, at 12021 (discussing EC Treaty provisions bearing on Community's power to regulate maritime transport).
35. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591 (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality).
36. See id. arts. 59-66, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-18 (containing provisions governing freedom to provide services).
37. See id. arts. 85-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-32 (setting forth EC competition
rules).
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A. Maritime Industry and Policy
The maritime industry is a complex industry covering a variety of shipping activities and the conditions governing the industry operations in each sector depend on the specific characteristics of that sector. 38 Shipping activities break down into different
sub-sectors depending on the type of good or passenger trans-

ported.

9

The regularity of the services provided also distin-

guishes between different types of shipping activities.4" The ma-

jor elements of a government's maritime policy are protectionism,"

employment, 42 international

competition

maritime

affairs,4"

and

policy.4 4
1. Maritime Industry Defined

The maritime industry involves the carriage of goods and
passengers over navigable water.4 5 In terms of EC maritime policy, and the EC Treaty, the maritime industry concerns the busi38. See ROCHDALE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (defining shipping industry); Commission Communication II, supra note 10, COM (96) 84 Final, at 2 (noting complex
nature of maritime industry and interdependence of its sectors).
39. See BRFDIMA-SAvoPouLou & TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 12 (describing basic
sectors of shipping industry). The basic categories of shipping activities according to
the kind of good transported are carriage of cargoes in bulk, carriage of general cargo,
which requires packaging, and carriage of cargo in containers. Id.; CAFRUNY, supra note
13, at 6, 184 (looking at major types of shipping activities). Carriage of passengers
constitutes another sector of the maritime industry. See Commission Report II, supra
note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 7 (designating passenger trades as separate type of
shipping activity).
40. See EDwARD F. STEVENS, SHPPING PRACTICE 1 (1979) (distinguishing between
liner services and tramp services). Liner trades run direct lines and regular services
between certain ports. Id. A tramp ship transports goods on the basis of a voyage or
time contract for "non-regularly scheduled or non-advertised sailings." Regulation
4056/86, supra note 24, art. 1(3)(a), 0.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986) (defining tramp vessel
services as distinguished from liner services).

41. See

BREDIMA-SAvOPOULOU

& TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 36 (describing protec-

tionism measures government adopts to aid and protect its merchant shipping).
42. See id. (defining employment element of maritime policy as government's
stand on employing non-national seamen on board national vessels).
43. See id. (including state's membership in international maritime organizations
and conventions as separate element of maritime policy).
44. See id. at 62 (noting that government's approach to liner conferences, pricefixing practices, and cargo-sharing arrangements define government's competition policy).
45. See id. at 12 (discussing martime industry). In terms of the EC maritime policy
and Article 84 of the EC Treaty, the maritime industry concerns the business of transporting goods and persons in ships across the sea for commercial return. Id. It excludes operations on inland waterways. Id.
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ness of transporting goods and persons in ships across the sea
for commercial return.4 6 In the context of EC maritime policy
then, the maritime industry excludes operations on inland waterways.

47

Shipping activities fall into various sub-sectors. 48 The maritime industry often breaks down the diverse shipping activities
into sub-sectors on the basis of the type of good or passenger
transported. 49 The types of activities according to this criterion
include the transportation of cargoes in bulk, which can be liquid5 ° or dry51 bulks.5 2 The transportation of general cargo" is
another shipping activity.5 4 Ships may also carry containers. 5
The transportation of passengers by sea represents another type
of shipping activity.56 Tourist services57 in the form of cruising
services constitute another sub-sector.
A different classifactory criterion looks at the regularity of
the service offered. 8 Liner5 9 services are services which provide
46. See ROCHDALE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (defining EC maritime industry as
"the business of transporting goods and persons in ships from a dockside point across
the sea for commercial return.").
47. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (stating in section
1 that provisions of Title IV, which governs transport, shall apply to transport by rail,
road, and inland waterway). Section 2 grants the Council permission to decide Whether
and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport. Id. Maritime transport is thus clearly treated separately from other types of Community transport. Greaves, supra note 2, at 123.
48. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 12 (defining shipping
industry).
49. Id.
50. Id. Oil and oil products are examples of liquid cargo. Id.
51. Id. Examples of dry cargo are iron ore, grain, and coal. Id.
52. Id. See also BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 195 (defining bulk as
"merchandise which is neither counted, weighed, nor measured.").

53. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 12-13 (defining general
cargo as finished manufactured products).
54. Id.; see Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 8 tbl.3
(analyzing cargo trades as falling into bulk cargo and general cargo).
55. BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 12-13. See PROTECrIONISM,
supra note 10, at 49 (discussing increased use of containers in recent years).
56. BREDIMA-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 13. See also Commission
Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 7-8 (assessing importance of passenger
trades in EC countries).

57.

BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU

& TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 13.

58. Id.
59. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 344 (characterizing liner as "[a] ship plying a fixed route or routes, sailing according to a predetermined schedule, which offers
cargo and/or passenger space at fixed rates to those who wish to have goods transported or to make journeys.").
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60
regular, scheduled transportation between specific ports.
Tramp6 1 services are services which operate to carry cargo in
ships hired wholly or partly for the carriage of cargoes on the
62
basis of a voyage or time charter or any other form of contract.
Liner trades tend to operate through organized liner conferences, 63 whose purpose is to absorb the effect of short-term6 4
fluctuations in market prices and secure stable service on established routes and goods.6" Liner conferences thus escape the
67
determination of freight rates6 6 by free market mechanisms.
Tramp vessel services, in contrast, employ freight rates which are
established in accordance with conditions of supply and demand.68

2. Major Elements of Maritime Policy
The key issues of a government's maritime policy include
60. Id.; see BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 13 (describing liner
services).
61. See PROTECrIONISM, supra note 10, at 345 (defining tramp ships as ships available on open market for hire for single voyage or for longer periods to carry any available cargo).
62. See Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, art. 1(3) (a), O.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986)
(explaining that tramp vessel services designate transport of cargo in ships hired for
specified time or voyage against rates of freight that "are freely negotiated case by case
in accordance with conditions of supply and demand."). Freight rates are transportation charges which depend on the size, weight, or amount of goods transported.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 666.
63. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 344 (defining liner conferences as "association of liner owners engaged in particular trade who have agreed upon uniform
freight rates."). Liner conferences regulate the liner trade in shipping. Id. at 33; see
STEVENS, supra note 40, at 3 (explaining that shipping companies which are members of
conference meet and discuss matters of general interest, set freight rates for specific
goods, and generally control and protect interests of all member.).
64. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1379 (characterizing short-term
as ordinarily due within one year).
65. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 24 (discussing role of liner conferences in
world maritime industry).
66. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 666 (defining freight rate as
transportation charge for goods carried based on weight of goods, number of packages,
or on mileage).
67. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 17-18 (describing arrangements of dividing
cargo trade equally among liner conferences members). By entering into cargo arrangements fixed over longer periods of time, liner conferences remain immune to the
effect of short-term market fluctuations. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 24-25
(discussing liner conferences and determination of freight rates).
68. See Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, art. 1 (3) (a), O.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986)
(stating that freight rates in tramp trades are determined on the basis of supply and
demand).
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71
7°
protectionism, employment, international maritime affairs,
and competition policy. 72 The most frequently employed forms
of protectionism are flag 73 preference 74 and state aid and assistance. 75 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 76 ("UNCTAD") is a major factor shaping international
69. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 36 (defining protectionism as referring to mechanisms government employs to aid and protect its
merchant shipping); PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 71 (reviewing major practices
governments employ to protect their own fleets).

70. See

BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU

&

TZOANNOS,

supra note 3, at 36 (relating employ-

ment issues, in maritime policy context, to rules governing employment and remuneration of seamen).
71. SeeJoseph C. Sweeney, From Columbus to Cooperation-Tradeand ShippingPolicies
from 1492 to 1992, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 481, 488-521 (1989/1990) (reviewing existing
international maritime public and private organizations). There exists a long history of
international regulation in maritime transportation. Id. Individual governments' positions with respect to international conventions and rules shape international maritime
affairs. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 31-33 (1982) (noting
that although nations used to view unilateral actions as legitimate means of international maritime claim resolution, more recent approach favors international negotiations as preferred method).
72. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 62 (explaining competition policy in terms of a government's attitude toward system of liner conferences and
practices of price-fixing and cargo-sharing arrangements).
73. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 66-70 (characterizing flags as symbols of nationalism and as means of identifying nationality of ships); COLOMBOS, supra note 13, at 291
(stating that "[t]he flag which a ship flies is the evidence of her nationality"); SINGH,
supra note 30, at 1 (describing maritime flag as identification mark of ship). A ship,just
like any other unit of transport, must bear an identification mark because an unidentifiable "object of traffic would elude fixation of responsibility for its acts.., and thus defy
maintenance of law and order." Id. The flag is one of three marks of identification in
the case of ships. Id. The other two are the number and name of the ship, and the
ship's documents and certificates which each ship must carry. Id.; see COLOMBOS, supra
note 13, at 295 (asserting that ships must carry papers, which provide more efficient
means of testing ship's nationality). The flag determines the nationality of the ship and
this in turn determines the national law which governs the ship. SINGH, supra note 30,
at 3; see STEVENS, supra note 40, at 84 (explaining that vessel becomes subject to country
whose flag she is flying). The members of the crew are subject to the laws of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing. STEVENS, supra note 40, at 84. The flag is a
direct result of the registration of the ship. See SINGH, supra note 30, at 3 (detailing
connection between maritime flag and registration of ship). All ships must be registered, both when purchased new, directly from the shipyard, and when bought secondhand. Id. at 3-4;
74. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 16-17 (describing types of protectionist
mechanisms governments customarily employ in international shipping). Flag preference refers to a government's shipping policy which favors certain flags, generally the
domestic flag, in giving cargoes and granting privileges. Id. at 344.
75. Id. at 16-17. State aid and assistance consists mainly of financial aid and fiscal
relief to shipping. Id. at 147.
76. See G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 1,U.N. Doc. A/
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maritime affairs. 7 With respect to competition policy in the
maritime industry, the main issues concern a state's membership
in the system of liner conferences.78
a. Employment
The employment element of a government's maritime policy primarily concerns the legality of employing non-nationals
on board national flag vessels. 79 Because of its ties with international trade, ° the maritime industry often brings nationals of
81
different countries to work together on a shipping transaction.
At the 'same time, the aim of providing steady employment for
national seafarers may cause a government to reserve maritime
employment for its own seafarers, and to the exclusion of non8 2
nationals.
Within the European Community, a 1973 decision 8 1 of the
European Court of Justice 4 ("ECJ") made the policy of free
5815 (1964) (establishing the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD")). The U.N. General Assembly established UNCTAD as a response to the
increased political presence of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia. Sweeney, supra note 71, at 484 n.10. In view of the difficulties facing those states with respect
to their independent economic development, UNCTAD's purpose is to use trade and
aid to assist third-world countries to develop their national economies. Id.
77. See Sweeney, supra note 71, at 483-84 (referring to role of UNCTAD in achieving "the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law regarding
the vital shipping industry.").
78. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 62-65 (looking at competition policy in context of maritime industry).
79. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 48 (noting that governments may treat maritime sector differently from other economy sectors with respect to
employment of non'-nationals).
80. See PROTEcTIONISM, supra note 10, at 9-11 (detailing importance of maritime
transport for growing world commercial exchange).
81. Id. It would be possible nowadays for a ship built, for example, in Japan to
have a Greek owner and be manned by a crew of mixed nationality, including, for
instance, Italian officers and Philippino crew. Id. The ship owner may also have received financing from a New York bank and insured the vessel in London. Id.
82. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 314 (describing relation between employment in
maritime industry and protectionism). The U.S. Jones Act of 1920, reserving coastal
trade to U.S.-manned vessels, is a good example of a government policy seeking to
protect the jobs of national seafarers. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 App. U.S.C.
§ 883 (1997). The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 is popularly known as the Jones Act of
1920. See Robert W. Gruendel, Note, The Weakening Grip of United States Cabotage Law, 4
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 393 (1981) (reviewing provisions ofJones Act).
83. Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, French
Merchant Seamen, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 216 [hereinafter French Merchant Seamen].
84. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 50 (identifying European Court ofJustice
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movement of labor 5 and nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality8 6 applicable to the maritime transport sector.8 7 The
employment of other EC nationals on board a vessel flying the
flag of a Member State should therefore be as free and unimpeded as the employment of workers in any of the other EC industries. 8 A major qualification to the free employment of seafarers on board EC ships takes into account passenger safety considerations.8 " Member States may require that a certain
percentage of the crew members, and, in particular, those nominated on muster-rolls90 to assist passengers in emergency situations, have communication skills sufficient for that purpose.9 1
("ECJ") as EC chiefjudicial body). The ECJ's function is to ensure that the EC institutions and Member States observe the rules and principles of law when applying or interpreting the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The
ECJ's power to give binding interpretations of Community law is exclusive. Carl Otto
Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling Procedure, 18 FoRDtAM INrr'L L.J.
388, 392 (1994). The European Community's other legal body is the Court of First
Instance upon which the Council has conferred jurisdiction to hear "all direct actions
brought by natural or legal persons." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO

(1995).
85. See EC Treaty, supra note '1,
art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (providing for
the free movement of persons, as between Member States).
86. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 48(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. Article 48(2)
states:
Such freedom of movement [of workers] shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work
and employment.
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 72

Id.

87. French Merchant Seamen, [1974] E.C.R. at 371,
32-33, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at
219 (holding application of free movement of workers to maritime transport obligatory
for Member States).
88. See id. at 371, 1 32-33, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 219 (asserting that general EC
Treaty rules apply to maritime transport).
89. See Council Directive No. 94/58, O.J. L 319/28 (1994) [hereinafter Council
Directive 94/58] (setting requirements for minimum level of training for seafarers).
90. See BLACK'S LAw DIcTONARY, supra note 5, at 1019 (defining muster-roll as list
of"a ship's company, required to be kept by the master or other person having care of
the ship, containing the name, age, national character, and quality of every person
employed in the ship.").
91. Council Directive 94/58, supra note 89, art. 8(2), O.J. L 319/28, at 31 (1994).
Article 8(2) requires that Member States shall ensure that:
on board passenger ships, personnel nominated on muster lists to assist passengers in emergency situations are readily identifiable and have communication skills that are sufficient for that purpose, taking into account an appropriate and adequate combination of any of the following criteria:
(a) the language or languages appropriate to the principal nationalities of
passengers carried on a particular route;
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Those skills may include speaking the language or languages appropriate to the principal nationalities of passengers carried on
92
a particular route.
Among the EC fleets, the fleets of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom regularly employ non-national seafarers from third countries, particularly from the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, and South Korea.9 3 The major economic incentive for the employment of
seafarers from third countries on board EC flagged vessels is the
opportunity to hire third-country crew members at wages and
other conditions of employment which reflect the labor conditions in the seafarers' country of origin. 94 Hiring seafarers from
developing countries thus translates into labor cost savings for
95
the EC maritime industry.
b. International Maritime Affairs
In historical terms, international trade and shipping services
developed out of the transport services between a metropolitan
country and a colony96 for the purpose of expanding the export
(b) the likelihood that an ability to use elementary English vocabulary for basic instructions can provide a means of communicating with a passenger in
need of assistance whether or not the passenger and crew member share a
common language ; ...
(d) the extent to which complete safety instructions have been provided to
passengers in their native language or languages;
(e) the languages in which emergency announcements may be broadcast during an emergency or drill to convey critical guidance to passengers and to
facilitate crew members in assisting passengers.
Id.
92. Id.
93. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 59-52 (detailing Member States policy with respect to employment of seamen from third countries). See also
Commission Communication II, supra note 10, COM (97) 296 Final, at 19 annex A-4
(1996) (summarizing data on non-national seafarers on board EC flagged vessels, by
country, for 1983, 1992, and 1994).
94. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 50-51 (relating employment trends in maritime industries of EC Member States in 1970's and 1980's).
95. Id.
96. See 9 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 701 (2d ed. 1989) (defining metropoli-

tan as "belonging to the mother country, as distinct from colonial territories."). The
word metropolitan derives from metropolis, which means "chief center or seat of some
form of activity." Id. See also Sweeney, supra note 71, at 482-88 (discussing rise and fall
of European colonial empires in period between fifteenth and twentieth centuries).
The First British Empire lasted from 1497 until 1783, when the Peace Treaty with the
United States put an end to the British rule in North America. Id. at 487 n.17. The
Second British Empire spanned Australia, India, New Zealand, and Africa, and lasted
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trade of either one or both.97 The European colonial powers98
established and maintained overseas colonies in order to increase the wealth of their own nations by insuring a continuous
flow of raw materials, at controlled prices, from the shores of
Africa, Asia, and the Americas." The prevailing economic theory of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mercantilism, 10 0
asserted that a nation's strength and prosperity depended on the
amassing of reserves of gold and silver."0 ' To achieve prosperity,
the metropolitan countries first had to create, and then expand,
foreign trade, and develop production for export while limiting
imports to raw materials.' 0 2 Consequently, even without cabotage restrictions reserving the trade to national ships, the shipping services of the metropolitan country inevitably gained a
dominant position.' 3 In most cases, this dominant position surfrom 1788 to 1931, when Britain and the independent self-governing former colonies
entered into the British Commonwealth of Nations. Id. The First British Empire drove
the French out of North America and India, but France established its colonial power
in Africa after 1830, and the French empire ruled over North, Central and West Africa,
Indochina and the South Pacific until 1960. Id. The Spanish colonial empire began
with Columbus' first voyage to America and collapsed in 1898, with Spain's defeat in
the war with the United States over Cuba. Id. at 482-83 n.6. The Portuguese Empire
existed from 1497 to 1974 and comprised colonies in parts of Africa, Asia, and South
America. Id. at 485-86 n.14. The Dutch colonial expansion started in 1602, when the
Dutch drove the Portuguese and Spanish from Southeast Asia and South Africa, and
ended in 1949, when the Netherlands East Indies gained their independence. See 1
SEsAm ATLAS BIJ DE WERELDGESCHIEDENIS 245 (1987) (tracing beginning of Netherlands
colonies in Africa and Asia); 2 id. 225 (describing disintegration of world colonial powers). In more modern times, Germany, Italy, and Belgium established their colonies in
Africa. Id. at 109-119. The German colonial empire lasted only from 1870 to 1918,
and the Belgian colonial rule extended from 1885 to 1960. Id. Italy kept her colonies
between 1911 and 1941. Id.
97. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 3-6 (discussing role of shipping in international
relations and trade).
98. See Sweeney, supra note 71, at 482-88 (narrating history of colonial empires
that Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Italy maintained from fifteenth to seventeenth centuries).
99. See id. at 487-88 (detailing policies underlying European colonial expansion).
100. See W. CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN
MODERN TIMES 177 (6th ed. 1925) (describing mercantilism as seventeenth century economic policy whose central aim was amassing of treasure in form of gold and silver).
101. See id. (noting that inducing influx of precious metals was mercantilists' main
objective).
102. See id. (describing mercantilists' belief that "the encouragement of export
trade, and diminution of imports would leave a balance [of precious metals] in favor of
the [metropolitan] country.").
103. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 3-6 (describing development of international
trade out of shipping services between metropolitan countries and their colonies);
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10 4
vived the change of status of the former colonies.
Because shipping is vital in international -trade,1: 5 a developed maritime industry plays a major role in the economic and
political integration of the developing countries into the world
economy.'0 6 Only the existence of a strong national fleet and
the consequent control over shipping services can ensure the developing countries continuous and uninterrupted integration
into the world economy.10 7 As a result, in the post-World War II
period, developing countries followed a consistent policy of subsidizing and protecting their newly created national fleets.*'0 8
Mounting pressure, mainly from developing countries in the
years following World War II, led to the establishment of
UNCTAD whose main purpose is to use trade and aid to assist
third-world countries in developing their national economies. 0 9
The signing of the United Nations Convention on the Code of
Conduct for Liner Conferences 1 0 ("U.N. Liner Code") in 1974

supra note 13, at 274 (noting connection between colonial trade and development of world trade and prosperity).
104. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 3-6 (referring to weak position of developing
countries on world maritime market following their independence); GOLD, supra note
13, at 276 (mentioning domination of world shipping by developed countries in 1950s
and 1960s).
105. See id. (noting dependance of international trade on shipping services);
GOLD, supra note 13, at 276 (relating central role of maritime transport for development of international trade). In historic terms, "[f]r6m time immemorial, [maritime
transport] . . . has been the backbone of commercial viability." Id. Thus for example,
within a single century, from the mid-] 800s to the mid-1900s, the wealth and prosperity
of the European colonial countries increased over ten times. Id. at 274 The major
source of the prosperity of the European colonial powers was the trade with their colonies. Id.
106. Id.; see PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 7-15 (discussing development and
problems of protectionism in international shipping).
107. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 2-11 (focussing on role of national fleet for
promotion of national trade). See also PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 7-15 (discussing
importance of maritime transport in international trade); GOLD, supra note 13, at 279
(describing developing countries' argument that shipping is "a vital service to them,
and . . . regardless of profitability, they needed reliable maritime transport.").
108. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 153-246 (analyzing prevailing conditions of
world trade and shipping in period following World War II).
109. See Sweeney, supra note 71, at 484 n.10 (explaining purpose of UNCTAD).
110. UNCTAD, Convention on a Code of Conduct-for Liner Conferences, U.N.
Doc. TD/CODE/II/REV.1 (1974), 13 I.L.M. 917 [hereinafter U.N. Liner Code]. The
U.N. Liner Code was signed at Geneva on April 6, 1974 in response to further pressure
by the developing countries, which wanted to strengthen their negotiating positions in
the liner conferences. SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 17 (1988). The U.N. Liner Code
distributes maritime transport according to the 40-40-20 formula, i.e., 40% of the sea
trade is carried by liner vessels of the exporter country, 40% by liners of the importer
GOLD,
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further affected the relations among the world's maritime industries.1 1 1 The cargo-sharing provisions1 12 of the U.N. Liner Code
make the U.N., Liner Code discriminatory and protectionist in
1 13

nature.

The U.N. Liner Code received much support from the developing countries," 4 but a mixed reception from the developed
maritime nations.1 15 Among the EC Member States, France,
Belgium, and Germany voted in its favor, 1 6 while the United
Kingdom and Denmark opposed the U.N. Liner Code.1 1 7 The
divergence of opinion concerning joining the U.N. Liner Code
presented the European Community with a problem.' 1 8 The different positions that EC Member States took toward ratification
of the U.N. Liner Code was likely to result in wide divergence
between individual Member States' shipping practices within the
Community.11 9 The EC Treaty requires, however, that the Community approach matters concerning transport within a Common Transport Policy.' 20 Adopting a common position on the
country, and 20% is left open to third country carriers. Id. The United States firmly
opposes both the U.N. Liner Code and the European Community's commitment to the
U.N. Liner Code. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 243 (relating
U.S. position on U.N. Liner Code); Council Regulation No. 954/79, O.J. L 121/1
(1979) [hereinafter Regulation 954/79] (committing Member States to provisions of
U.N. Liner Code).
111. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 16-18 (discussing long negotiations before signing of U.N. Liner Code and opposition to U.N. Liner Code by developed countries,
particularly United Kingdom, United States of America, and Denmark). The developed maritime nations found the regulation of liner conferences undesirable because
restrictions on free competition in the liner conference system was likely to increase
prices. Id. at 17.
.112. U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110, art. 2. Article 2 distributes maritime transport according to the 40-40-20 formula, i.e., 40% of the sea trade is carried by liner
vessels of the exporter country, 40% by liners of the importer country and 20% is left
open to third country carriers. Id. 13 I.L.M. at 920-21.
113. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 17-18 (detailing effect of Article 2 of U.N.
Liner Code on relations between developed and developing countries).
114. See id. at 16 (relating response of world maritime industries to U.N. Liner
Code).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Bridget Hogan, West German Ratification of the Liner Code May Fuel Talks,
LLOYD's LIsT, April 11, 1983, at 1 (describing EC Member States' response and attitude
to U.N. Liner Code).
118. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 16 (relating effect of U.N. Liner Code on Community's efforts at common transport policy).
119. Id.
120. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 74, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623 (asserting that
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U.N. Liner Code became an important EC objective, 12' and in
1979, the Council passed Council Regulation 954/79122 ("'Regulation 954/79") which committed
the EC Member States to the
U.N. Liner Code's provisions. 12 3 Regulation 954/79 required
Member States to adopt1 24 the U.N. Liner Code subject to certain modifications, the most important of which was that the
cargo-allocation provisions of the U.N. Liner Code will not apply
in conference trade between Member States. 125 The U.N. Liner
Code in its entirety, however, will apply to the trades between
126
Member States and developing countries.
c. Competition Policy
The most common concern of a government's competition
policy, in the maritime market context, relates to the system of
liner conferences, which involves price-fixing 12 7 and market
sharing 1 28 arrangements.

29

The extent to which liner confer-

Member States shall pursue EC Treaty objectives concerning transport within framework of common transport policy).
121. See Regulation 954/79, supra note 110, pmbl., OJ. L 121/1, at 1 (1979) (emphasizing necessity for common position in relation to U.N. Liner Code).
122. See id. (encouraging Member States to ratify or accede to U.N. Liner Code).
123. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 79-81 (discussing EC
measures relating to UNCTAD and U.N. Liner Code).
124. See 1996 C.M.I. Y.B. 468 (listing U.N. Liner Code signatories). Today, the
only maritime Member States which have not ratified the U.N. Liner Code are Greece
and Ireland. Id.
125. See Regulation 954/79, supra note 110, art. 4(2), O.J. L 121/1, at 2 (1979)
(stating that Article 2 of U.N. Liner Code "shall not be applied in conference trades
between Member States."). Article 3(1) of Regulation 954/79 provides that the share
allocated under the U.N. Liner Code to EC lines participating in liner conferences
"shall be redistributed .... on the basis of a unanimous decision by those shipping lines
which are members of the conference and participate in the redistribution." Id. art.
3(1), OJ. L 121/1, at 2 (1979). Article 3(2) further provides that the "share finally
allocated to each participant shall be determined by the application of commercial
principles." Id. art. 3(2), O.J. L 121/1, at 2 (1979). Article 4(2) also allows Member
States to apply the same principles in conference trade between Member States and
other OECD countries, provided the conference members can reach suitable reciprocal
agreements on the redistribution of cargo allocation. Id. art. 4(2), O.J. L 121/1, at 2
(1979).
126. See id. art. 4(3), OJ. L 121/1, at 2 (1979) (stating that Article 4(2) shall not
affect opportunities for participation of developing countries in conference trades).
127. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1189 (defining price-fixing as
"[t]he cooperative setting of price levels or range by competing firms, which would
otherwise be set by natural market forces."); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 55 (stating that
"at a minimum, conferences fix freight rates on particular trade routes," thus eliminating price competition among its members).
128. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 971 (referring to market share
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ences restrict free competition on the maritime market depends
on whether the conferences are open or closed.1"' Open conferences keep liner trades open to new members," 1 while closed
conferences resist admission of new members.1 3 2 Closed conferences, furthermore, often preclude outside shipping lines that
are not members of a conference from access to the relevant
liner trade.1 33 Within the frameworks of UNCTAD and the Or34
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), all EC Member States except Greece 135 have sought
to reconcile the usefulness of the existing liner conferences for
securing regular and frequent services, on the one hand, and
the need to limit the conference practices that distort competition, on the other.1 3 6 All EC Member States, apart from Ireland
and Greece, have respectively ratified the U.N. Liner Code. 37
EC Member States, in general, favor the closed conference system, 138 which means that entry into a conference is limited to
as percentage of market "controlled by a firm."); SINGH, supra note 30, at 109 (explaining that liner conferences aim at reserving cargoes for their members).
129, See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 62 (analyzing competition policy as element of a government's maritime policy); ROCHDALE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 116 (defining conference as "any type of formal or informal agreement between shipowners that restricts competition."); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 57 (characterizing shipping conferences as "the most obvious form of restraint on competition.").

130. See

BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU

&

TZOANNOS,

supra note 3, at 62 (discussing rela-

tion between liner conferences and government's competition policy).
131. See id. at 62-64 (describing distinction between open and closed liner confer-

ences); B.M.

DEAKIN & T. SEWARD, SHIPPING CONFERENCES: A STUDY OF THEIR ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC PRACICES 1 (1973) (explaining that open conferences

"may be joined by any shipowner without the consent of existing members.").
132. See SINGH, supra note 30, at 109 (discussing closed liner conferences); DE.IN
& SEWARD, supra note 131, at 1 (clarifying that new members can join closed conferences only with consent, usually by unanimous vote, of existing members).

133. See

BREDIMA-SAvOPOULOU

& TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 62 (discussing effect

of liner conferences on free competition as depending on whether conference is closed
or open, and on position of closed conferences with respect to non-member liner companies); SINGH, supra note 30, at 109 (describing closed conference practices).
134. See OECD Convention, supra note 10 (defining OECD purpose and membership).
135. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 64 (relating how
Greek government has opted for more stringent international rules allowing all qualified shipping companies to join liner conferences). Id. The Greek position reflects the
great difficulties Greek shipping companies have experienced in their attempts to join
liner conferences. Id.
136. Id.
137. See 1996 C.M.I. Y.B., supra note 124, at 468 (listing all states that have ratified
U.N. Liner Code).
138. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 15 (noting prevalence
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the shipping companies with which existing member companies
wish to cooperate.139 EC Member States' governments have,
however, pursued open policies concerning liner companies
which are not members of a closed liner conference, aimed at
keeping liner conferences in which Member States participate
open to outsiders.1 4 °
d. Protectionist Activities
Protectionism in shipping takes different forms,' the most
widely-spread of which are various manifestations of flag preference and state aid and assistance. 142 The major categories of
flag preference are cargo reservation 143 and cabotage restricof closed conferences in system of liner conferences in which Member States participate); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 196 (referring to preference of West European shipping companies for closed conferences). Liner conferences developed originally from
the liner companies serving the trade between the European metropolitan countries
and their colonies. BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 15; see CAFRUNY,
supra note 13, at 53-54 (tracing development of liner conferences to nineteenth century
trades with colonies); PROTECrIONISM, supra note 10, at 33 (stating that liner conferences were initially established to organize and control trade between colonial powers
and their overseas possessions); GOLD, supra note 13, at 115-16 (noting that by end of
19th century, conference agreements covered major part of shipments from Europe to
South America, Africa, India, Australia, and Far East). The traditionally strong ties between the former metropolitan countries and their colonies persist today in the closed
conferences dominating the EC liner trades. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS,
supra note 3, at 15 (analyzing EC liner trades).
139. See BPEDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining meaning of closed conferences).
140. See id. at 64 (describing EC Member States' position regarding outsiders).
Outsiders are liner companies which are not members of liner conferences. Id.
141. See PROTECTION)''I4d, supra note 10, at 11 (overviewing existence and role of

protectionism in international shipping).
142. Id. at 16-17 (analyzing types of protectionist measures states customarily employ in their shipping policy).
143. See id. at 72 (explaining cargo reservation as generic term covering cargo
sharing and cargo preference). Both cargo sharing and cargo preference involve state
action, in the form of adopting legislation or concluding treaties, aimed at reserving a
certain portion of trade for vessels flying the national flag. See George H. Hearn, Cargo
Preference and Control, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 481, 481-82 (1971) (analyzing underlying
principles and essence of cargo reservation practices). Cargo sharing means literally
"sharing" available cargo among participating parties and is the most fair of the restrictive shipping practices governments employ. B.N. METAXAS, THE ECONOMICS OF TRAMP
SHIPPING 24-26 (1971). Under cargo preference practices, a government allocates available cargo giving priority to its domestic carriers, or trading partners, rather than leave
cargo distribution to free market forces. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 73. Another
method of effecting cargo preference is to reserve high quality cargoes which generate
higher freight rates to ships flying the national flag, while distributing the bulky, low
quality cargoes to other ships. Id.
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time industry are the usual forms of state aid and assistance.' 4 7
i. Cabotage
Cabotage or coasting trade,' 48 refers to the trade or navigation in coastal waters between two points within a country.' 4 9
Cabotage also refers to the right to engage in trade and navigation in coastal waters and to the restriction of that right to domestic carriers.' 50 The term in essence denotes the discriminatory practice of keeping foreign flags out of coastal waters' and
144. See COLOMBOS, supra note 13, at 383 (defining cabotage as practice of excluding foreign vessels from coastal trade).
145. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147 (identifying operating subsidies as
main form of financial aid). A subsidy is a "grant of money made by government in aid
of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government
desires to participate, or which is considered a proper subject for government aid, because such purpose is likely to be of benefit to the public." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY,
supra note 5, at 1428.
146. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147 (describing fiscal relief as depreciation privileges government extends to shipping industry). Depreciation privileges refer
to the reasonable allowance a taxpayer may deduct from her taxable income "for the
exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) of property used in the trade or business, or of property held for the production of income."
I.R.C. § 167(a) (1986). The Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") is that body of law which
codifies all federal tax laws in the United States of America. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 5, at 816.
147. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147.
148. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 282 (defining coasting trade as
commerce and trade along coast); L. Oppenheim, The Meaning of Coasting-Tradein Commercial Treaties, 24 L.Q. REv. 328, 329 (1908) (equating cabotage with coasting trade).
149. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 202 (identifying cabotage with
coasting trade "so that it means navigating and trading along the coast between the
ports thereof."). Cabotage is the contrast to navigation on the open sea and to over-sea
trade between distant parts of the globe. Oppenheim, supra note 148, at 329. Open
sea designates the "mass of any great body of water, as distinguished from its margin or
coast, its harbors, bays, creeks, inlets." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1091.
150. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 310 (stating that cabotage is
'trade or transport in coastal waters or between two points within a country especially
by other than domestic carriers."). Etymologically the word derives from the French
caboter, "to sail along the coast", which originated from the Spanish cabo meaning
"promontory," which in turn developed from the Latin for head, caput. Id. The term
cabotage originally indicated navigation from cape to cape along the same coast-line
without going out into the open sea. Oppenheim,.supra note 148, at 329. The original
meaning of cabotage has expanded over the centuries to include navigation and trade
between two ports of the same state, irrespective of whether the ports are on the same
coast or on different coasts. Id. at 330.
151. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 75-76 (referring to cabotage as discriminatory exclusion of foreign flag ships from coastal waters);. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, A TREATISE, VOL. I - PEACE 625 n.4 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 9th ed. 1955)
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thus often constitutes an element of a government's maritime
policy as a category of flag preference. 5 2 The idea behind cabotage restrictions is to promote the development of national
merchant fleets. 15 The U.S. Jones Act of 1920'15 is a well-known
and U.S.case in point, 1 5 requiring U.S.-built, U.S.-owned,
1 56
trade.
coastal
all
out
carry
to
vessels
manned
With respect to the European Community, in 1985, one
year before the enactment of the 1986 Legislative Package on
maritime policy, cabotage restrictions were in force in France,
(describing cabotage as practice, since ancient times, of reserving coastal trade for domestic ships).
152. See PROTECrIONISM, supra note 10, at 147 (characterizing cabotage restrictions
as category of flag preference); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 59 (1987) (defining cabotage
as wide-spread flag-preference practice of reserving coastal shipping for national fleet).
153. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 75.
154. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 App. U.S.C. § 883 (1997) (providing for
forfeiture of any cargo transported between United States ports by vessels not built,
owned, or manned by United States citizens). See Gruendel, supra note 82, at 391-94
(discussing cabotage restrictions in United States and applicable statutory provisions).
"The Jones Act" is also a name often given to Chapter 18 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1920, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688 (1997) (concerning liability for injuries to seamen). 46
App. U.S.C. § 688.
155. See GOLD, supra note 13, at 192 (characterizing Jones Act of 1920 as protectionist U.S. measure striving to improve competitive position of U.S. shipping in international maritime transport).
156. See 46 App. U.S.C. § 883. Section 883 states
No merchandise . .. shall be transported by water, or by land and water, on
penalty of forfeiture of the merchandise (or a monetary amount up to the
value thereof as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, or the actual cost
of the transportation, whichever is greater, to be recovered from any consigner, seller, owner, importer, consignee, agent, or other person or persons
so transporting or causing said merchandise to be transported), between
points in the United States, including Districts, Territories, and possessions
thereof embraced within the coast-wise laws, either directly or via a foreign
port, or for any part of the transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel
built in and documented under the laws of the United States and owned by
persons who are citizens of the United States.
Id. The U.S. Congress has maintained protectionist legislation, such as the Jones Act,
because Congress believes that a viable merchant fleet is requisite for both commercial
and defensive purposes. See Hearn, supra note 143, at 481-82 (outlining cargo preference systems of United States as expression of protectionist policy in maritime industry
and purpose behind cargo preference policy); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 App.
U.S.C. § 1101. Section 1101 asserts that
[iit is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine (a)
sufficient to...

provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of

[its) domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times [and] (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary.
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Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. 157 Denmark maintained cabotage restrictions for the trade with the Faroes. 158 At
that time, in all of the above Member States, except for Germany, cabotage involved mostly services to islands, 59 for exam161
60
the Balearies, 162
ple, islands in the Aegean Sea,' Madeira,
Corsica,' 6 3 and Sicily.' 6 4

Because coastal trade provides vital

services of goods and passenger carriage to various parts of their
countries,1 6 5 it has national security implications, 6 6 thus the
Member States defended the maintenance of cabotage restric157. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 42-43 (reviewing existence of cabotage restrictions in EC Member States).
158. Id.; see 5 ENCYCLOPaeDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 12, at 736 (explaining that
Faroe Islands are autonomous dependency of Denmark situated between Great Britain
and Iceland).
159. Id.
160. See 1 ENCYCLOP~eEA BRITANNICA, supra note 12, at 197 (defining Aegean Sea
as sea situated in area between Greek mainland and Asia Minor).
161. See 9 id. at 175 (noting that Madeira is name of island situated in Atlantic
Ocean, about 400 miles from North-West coast of Africa).
162. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 19, at 166 (describing Balearic Islands
as group of islands in Mediterranean Sea off coast of Spain including especially Majorca, Minorca, and Iviza).
163. See id. at 513 (defining Corsica as French island in Mediterranean Sea).
164. See id. at 2110 (explaining that Sicily is Italian island in Mediterranean Sea,
west of Italian peninsula).
165. See Sweeney, supra note 71, at 522 (noting importance of cabotage for guaranteeing year round access to mainland for island dwellers in Mediterranean and North
Sea areas); BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 42 (noting role of
coastal shipping for constant and uninterrupted carriage of goods and passengers between different points along Member States' coasts). In countries with a long coastal
line or with terrain consisting of a number of separate land areas such as island archipelagoes, as in the case of Greece, the Northern parts of the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway, a shipping fleet linking the various parts of the country becomes
essential. SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 5.

166. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 42 (referring to Member States' argument that production of maritime services entail national security dimension). Greece, for example, was particularly concerned about its national defense
due to the location of a significant number of Greek islands in close proximity to Turkey, with which relations have not always been good. Id. at 158. Greece was unwilling
to relinquish control over maritime services to and from those islands. Id. See also SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 5-6 (describing most nations' unwillingness to permit any dependence on foreign shipping services in coastal trade). By imposing cabotage restrictions,
a state establishes control over coastal services which are a means of transport essential
for maintaining efficient national communication and economic unification. Id. A
well-developed communication infrastructure is vital for a state's national defense. Id.
Strong merchant fleets also serve as military auxiliaries in time of war or national emergency. Hearn, supra note 156, at 482.
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tions on strategic grounds. a6 v
ii. Other Protectionist Activities
Cargo reservation is another major form of flag preference
protectionism. 168 Specific state practices coming under the
heading of cargo reservation include cargo sharing 169 and cargo
preference. av Cargo sharing describes the distribution of available cargo among a country's national shipping companies and
the shipping companies of the country's trading partners.'
The U.N. Liner Conference provides an example of a multilateral cargo sharing agreement. 172 The U.N. Liner Code allocates
forty percent of the trade to vessels of the exporting country,
forty percent to vessels of the importing country, and leaves the
remaining twenty percent of the trade to third-country shipping
lines.

17

Cargo preference refers to the practice of enacting laws
167. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing arguments by EC Member States for maintaining cabotage restrictions).
168. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 71. (describing cargo reservation as category of flag preference).
169. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 26 (defining cargo sharing as practice of dividing cargoes among fleets of trade-generating nations).
170. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 71 (analyzing sub-elements of cargo reservation); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 59 (defining cargo preference as type of flag preference reserving cargoes for vessels under national flag).
171. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 71 (discussing cargo sharing); CAFRUNY,

supra note 13, at 26 (defining cargo sharing).
172. See SINGH, supra note 30, at 109-110 (1978) (characterizing U.N. Liner Code
as spelling out rational criteria for cargo sharing in world maritime transport); PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 72 (noting that U.N. Liner Code serves as good example of
principles behind cargo sharing); BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at
41 (referring to U.N. Liner Code as typical cargo sharing arrangement).
173. U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110, art. 2(4), 13 I.L.M. at 920-21. Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Liner Code states:
When determining a share of trade within a pool of individual member lines
and/or groups of national shipping lines ... the following principles regarding their right of participation in the trade carried by the conference shall be
observed, unless otherwise mutually agreed:
(a) The group of national shipping lines of each of two countries the foreign
trade between which is carried by the conference shall have equal rights to
participate in the freight and volume of traffic generated by their mutual foreign trade and carried by the conference;
(b) Third-country shipping lines, if any, shall have the right to acquire a significant part, such as 20 per cent, in the freight and volume of traffic generated
by that trade.
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mandating that national flag vessels carry a certain proportion of
export and import cargo in various trades.' 7 4 Cargo preference,
as a protectionist state policy, is most advanced in the Latin
American region.1 75 On the average, fifty percent of all export
and import cargoes to and from 6the countries of Latin America
17
must move on national vessels.
The most common forms of state aid and assistance that
governments resort to in order to improve their merchant fleets'
competitive position are financial aid and fiscal relief to the maritime industry. 177 Financial aid often comes in the shape of maritime subsidies. 178 The purpose of maritime subsidies is to maintain services, which are essential to the public welfare or national
interest, at a price that the public can readily afford.' 79 Without
governmental financial aid the services in question would come
174. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 59 (noting that cargo preference refers to practice of reserving cargoes for domestic vessels); PROTECTIONISM, supra nOte 10, at 73 (defining cargo preference as governmental policy aimed at setting up order for carrier
preference in favor of domestic carriers); Hearn, supra note 142, at 481 (describing
cargo preference as practice of many countries to ensure certain amounts of their
ocean commerce for their national merchant fleets). The most frequent form of cargo
preference covers allotting government-financed or government-controlled exports,
military-related cargoes, or foreign aid shipments to ships of the national flag. CAFRuNv, supra note 13, at 59. See also SINGH, supra note 30, at 77 (justifying cargo preference practice on grounds of government possession and control over cargoes which are
subject of cargo preference).
175. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 159-62 (reviewing cargo preference practices in
world shipping); Hearn, supra note 143, at 489-91 (examining cargo preference laws in
Latin American countries); MICHAEL MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE SEA:

THE CASE OF BRAZIL 267-82 (1979) (analyzing major common characteristics of shipping policies of Latin American countries).
176. See CAFRuNY, supra note 13, at 160 (reporting on significant cargo preferences
under national law in developing countries). In 1984, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and
Uruguay reserved 50% of imports and exports for domestic carriers. Id. The Dominican Republic reserved 40% of the seagoing trade to her national flag ships, and Peru
reserved 30%. Id. Brazil mandated that 100% of government-related goods travel on
Brazilian ships. Id. See also Hearn, supra note 143, at 489-91 (describing cargo preference practices in each Latin American country).
177. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147 (describing major forms of state aid
to shipping).
178. Id.; see CAFRuNv, supra note 13, at 57 (characterizing subsidies as promotional
government measure designed to assist national flag shipping). A subsidy is a payment
to individuals or businesses by a government for which the government receives no
products or services. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147.
179. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 148 (defining maritime subsidies);
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 970-71 (1975) (noting
that grant of operating subsidy to U.S. shipping industry requires determination of pub-

lic interest).
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to the public at a much higher price.18 0 The operational maritime subsidy in the United States provides a typical example of a
state subsidy to the shipping industry. 8 ' In the United States,
the operational subsidy is based on the difference between the
fair and reasonable cost of insurance, maintenance, repairs not
8 2
compensated by insurance, and wages of officers and crew.1
Governments may also extend special protection to the national maritime industry by adjustments in government fiscal
policy.'8 3 Tax depreciation allowances to the shipping industry
are a major form of fiscal relief.18 4 Depreciation refers to a reduction in the value of fixed assets.'8 5 The effect of depreciation
180. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 147. In the United States, for example, the
federal government subsidizes airlines to carry mail, railroads and other means of public transportation, and the merchant marine industry to build and operate ships. Id.; see
GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 179, at 970-71 (tracing development of U.S. program of
maritime subsidies). Since World War I, the U.S. shipping industry has been unable to
compete in international maritime transport without U.S.-government help. GOLD,
supra note 13, at 192. See also SIR OSBORNE MANCE, INTERNATIONAL SEA TRANSPORT 74

(1945) (describing U.S. shipping as instrument of national policy maintained at large
cost to serve total needs of commerce and defense).
181. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 66 (tracing beginnings of U.S. "elaborate system of subsidies to shipping" in 1920s and 1930s); GOLD, supra note 13, at 195 (describing U.S. Merchant Marine Act of 1936 as "the first maritime-policy formulation anywhere" serving as model for all later U.S. shipping legislation). The Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 set up a subsidy system aimed at removing the competitive disadvantage to
the U.S. merchant fleet due to the higher cost of U.S. flag operation in comparison
with non-American shipping companies. See 46 App. U.S.C. §§ 1171-1182 (providing
for "operating-differential subsidy" to vessels); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 179, at 96970 (describing U.S. state subsidies to shipping industry) .
182. 46 App. U.S.C. § 1173. Exceptionally high operating costs can be due to reasons beyond the control of the shipowner. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 152. In the
United States, the high national wage level puts the operation of U.S. vessels at a particular disadvantage. Id.; see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 179, at 970 (ascribing high cost
of U.S. vessel operation to high crew wages).
183. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 60 (describing forms of fiscal relief as expression of protectionist policies).
184. Id. at 19; PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 161-64 (analyzing depreciation as
type of state aid governments extend to national maritime industries).
185. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 161 (analyzing depreciation). Fixed assets are assets of permanent or long-term nature used in the operation of a business and
not intended for sale, for example, equipment, plant, or property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 118. Three factors determine the amount of the depreciation
allowance. See I BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GiFrS 23-3 (2d ed. 1989) (defining concept of depreciation and methods
of determining depreciation allowance). The period of time during which the taxpayer
expects to use the depreciable property, known as the property's useful life, is one of
the three factors. Id. Another factor is the original purchase price of the property. Id.
The other factor is the value of the property at the end of the property's useful life,
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allowances is to decrease tax obligations and correspondingly
186
improve the cash flow resulting from an investment in ships,
8 7
which ultimately results in promotion of national shipping.
EC Member States have expressed a clear preference for a
liberal'
approach to maritime transport.18 9 - This preference
underlies the Member States' common commitment to promote
the principle of free access to shipping in international trade in
free and fair competition. 9 ° Despite this general commitment,
EC Member States have pursued some measure of protectionist
which determines the property's salvage value. Id. The depreciation allowance is determined by allocating the excess of the property's original cost over the property's salvage
value among the taxable years during the property's useful life. Id. Under the straight
line method, the excess of cost over salvage is spread in equal amounts over the years of
the property's useful life. Id. Because the life of a ship is a function of use rather than
of time, the maritime industry employs the production method, which calculates depreciation in proportion to the number of hours of operation of the ship, rather than the
ship's projected useful life. PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 161. Under an accelerated method, the depreciation allowance is relatively large when the taxpayer first
places the property in service and steadily declines in succeeding periods. BIrrKER &
LOKKEN, supra, at 23-24.

186. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 38 (looking at role of
fiscal concessions in maritime industries).
187. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 19 (relating effect of tax depreciation allowances on national shipping industries).
188. See FRED L. BLOCK, ORIGINS OF INTERNArIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER: A STUDY
OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 32-42

(1977) (making distinction between "liberal internationalism" and "national capitalism" in post-World War II world economy). The liberal internationalism approach in
the post-World War II era called for free trade in an open world market, where rival
powers would no longer need to create exclusive commercial spheres. CAFRuNY, supra
note 13, at 74. Liberalism also pressed for the dissolution of the existing imperial blocs
and the establishment of a system based on equal opportunity for all nations instead.
Id. The national capitalism approach, by contrast, insisted on preserving the existing
imperial blocs and exclusive economic spheres as a means of solving the problem of
post-war reconstruction. See id. at 73-75 (describing international economic climate in
post-World War II period).
189. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 37 (presenting EC
Member States' stance on protectionist activities in maritime transport); CAFRUNY, supra
note 13, at 230-31 (noting that understanding limitations of purely national policies, EC
Member States have sought to repel commercial and political challenges stemming
from protectionist practices by third countries).
190. BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 37; see Commission Communication II, supra note 10, COM (96) 81 Final, at 20 (emphasizing EC objective of
securing free access and fair competitive conditions throughout global shipping market); OECD, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CURRENT INVISIBLE OPERATIONS, Annex A, 59
n.1 (1962) [hereinafter OECD CODE] (asserting adherence of governments of OECD
Member States to principle of free and fair competition in international shipping and
trade).
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intervention in the maritime market.19 1 Cargo reservation in international trade exists in France, Portugal, and Spain.1 92 Council Regulation 954/79, which committed the EC Member States
to the U.N. Liner Code, institutionalized cargo sharing in the
liner trades.' 9 3 With respect to state aid, shipping companies in
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom receive operating subsidies from their governments.194 In
all Member States there also exist special subsidies to shipping
lines for the operation of services on certain unprofitable routes
which are considered important for the national interest, for example routes to remote islands. 9 5 Accelerated depreciation allowances 9 6 exist for shipowning enterprises in all EC Member
97
States except Greece.
B. Legal Frameworkfor EC Maritime Policy
The major objectives of the Community are to promote a
191. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 37 (reviewing protectionist activities by Member States).
192. Id. at 39-41. France, for example, reserves 40% of coal imports and 100% of
government controlled shipments for national flag carriers. Id. Portugal reserves 100%
of government controlled cargo for Portuguese flag vessels. Id. Spain also requires that
all government controlled shipments move in Spanish flag ships. Id.
193. Id. at 41; see U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110, art. 2(4), 13 I.L.M. at 920-21
(distributing maritime transport according to 4040-20 formula, i.e., 40% of sea trade is
carried by liner vessels of exporter country, 40% by liners of importer country, and 20%
is left open to third country carriers).
194. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 41 (reviewing operating subsidies in Member States); GOLD, supra note 13, at 196-200 (tracing history of

state aid to shipping industry in France, Germany, and Italy back to 1920s and 1930s);
CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 133-35, 214-21 (describing subsidies to maritime industry in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom). Among the EC Member States, the German shipping industry has received the lowest amount of subsidies. Id. at 215. Subsidies to the French shipping industry have been comparatively heavy. Id. at 210-11, 217.
195. BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 37.
196. See BiTrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 185, at 23-4 (explaining accelerated depreciation as special depreciation allowance whereby allowance is relatively large during
initial years of property's life and then steadily declines in succeeding years).
197. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 38 (describing fiscal
relief systems promoting shipping industries of Member States); PROTECTIONISM, supra
note 10, at 162-63 (detailing German depreciation system as exemplifying concept of
depreciation allowance); CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 216-21 (referring to significant
levels of support to shipowners in form of special depreciation allowances in Germany,
France, and United Kingdom). The Greek taxation system grants no special tax concession to shipping enterprises. BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 38.
See also GOLD, supra note 13, at 197 (characterizing Greek shipping as traditionally completely free-enterprising and operating without state support).
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harmonious development of economic activities, sustainable economic growth,, economic and social cohesion, and solidarity
among Member States by establishing a common market. 19 8 For
these purposes, Article 3(f) provides that the activities of the
Community shall include a common policy in the sphere of
transport. 199 Community action in the sphere of transport, including maritime transport, must observe the fundamental Community principles 0 0 of nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality, 2 1 the freedom to provide services, 20 2 and EC competition
rules.2 03
198. See EC Treaty, supra note Iart. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. Article 2 states:
The community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an
economic and monetary union and by implementing the common policies or
activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of
social protection, the raiding of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Id.
199. Id. art. 3(f), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. According to Article 74 of the EC
Treaty, the objectives of the Treaty in transport matters "shall ...be pursued by Member States within the framework of a common transport policy." Id. art. 74, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 623.
200. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 120-21 (reviewing EC Treaty provisions bearing
on EC maritime policy).
201. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591 (stating that
"[w]ithin the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.").
202. Id. arts. 59-66, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-18. Specifically, Article 59 of the EC
Treaty states that "restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community
shall be progressively abolished ... in respect of nationals of Member States who are
established in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the
services are intended." Id. art. 59, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616. Article 60 further specifies
that "the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his
activity in the State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as are
imposed by that State on its own nationals." Id. art. 60, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617. Article 61 of the EC Treaty asserts that "freedom to provide services in the field of transport
shall be governed by the provisions of the Tide relating to transport." Id. art. 61, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 617.
203. Id. arts. 85-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-34. There are two sets of competition
rules, Articles 85 to 90, which apply to undertakings, and Articles 92 to 94, which relate
to "Aids granted by States". Id. Article 85 of the EC Treaty states in relevant part:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between under-takings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
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1. Need for Maritime Policy
Due to its strong links with international trade, maritime
transport is an international industry. 20 4 More than other transport modes, shipping tends therefore to be subject to international agreements, regulations, and trends. 20 5 The UNCTAD
and the U.N. Liner Conference have become important channels of regulating international maritime trade. 20 6 The principles of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible
Operations 20 7 ("OECD Code"), which covers maritime transport,
have further guided EC Member States' activities in international shipping. 20 The OECD Code provides for complete freedistortion of com-petition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices ro any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply...
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
Id. art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty provides in pertinent part:
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the common market.
Id. art. 92(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630.
204. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 2-3 (describing shipping as important tool of
international trade); PROTECTIONISM, supra 10, at 10-11 (noting genuinely international

nature of maritime transport); MARK CLOUGH & FERGUS RANDOLPH, SHIPPING AND EC
COMPETITION LAw 3 (1991) (stating that "[t]he shipping industry is by its very nature
international"); CAFRUN , supra note 13, at 13 (pointing out that "merchant shipping is,
by definition, an international business"). Before the advent of air services, shipping
was actually the only truly international mode of travel. SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 3.
205. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 123 (mentioning long history of international
regulation in maritime transportation as factor setting maritime transport apart from
other means of transport); CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 1 (referring to
international treaties and agreements on shipping as key feature reflecting special characteristics of shipping industry).
206. See SHIPPING, supra note 30, at 3 (looking at international organizations and
agreements influencing international shipping relations).
207. OECD CODE, supra note 190.
208. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 37 (describing Member States' commitment to principles of OECD Code); PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at
228 (noting direct consequences of OECD Code for relations between Community and
third countries).
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dom of maritime commerce. 209 The EC Member States' attempts to generalize the OECD Code shipping liberalism to
world maritime trade in the 1960s and 1970s, however, encountered increasing protectionism and competition from developing countries and the Eastern bloc states. 21 ° The United
States2 1 ' too was pursuing a protectionist policy, reserving a significant proportion of U.S.-generated cargo for U.S. flag vessels.2 1 2 The advent of the container shipping 2 13 in the early
209. See OECD CODE, supra note 190, Annex A, at 59 n.1. The OECD Code provides:
As the shipping policy of the Governments of the Members is based on the
principle of free circulation of shipping in international trade in free and fair
competition, it follows that the freedom of transactions and transfers in connection with maritime transport should not be hampered by measures in the
field of exchange control, legislative provisions in favor of the national flag, by
arrangements made by governmental or semi-governmental organizations giving preferential treatment to national flag ships, by preferential shipping
clauses in trade agreements, by the operation of import and export licensing
systems so as to influence the flag of the carrying ship, or by discriminatory
port regulations or taxation measures - the aim always being that liberal and
competitive commercial and shipping practices and procedures should be followed in international trade and normal commercial considerations should
alone determine the method and flag of shipment.
Id.
210. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 129 (describing relations and climate in world
maritime market in 1960s and 1970s); ROCHDALE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46 (noting

that cargo reservation practices of U.S. sponsored Latin American Free Trade Area set
"a dangerous precedent" with far-reaching consequences).
211. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 131 (relating how United States accepted
OECD Code in its entirety, but expressed reservations regarding application of shipping clauses). Respecting the United States' position with respect to the OECD Code,
the Council of the OECD accepted that the OECD Code would not apply to commercial practices under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government. See OECD CODE, supra
note 190, Annex C, at 105 (stating that provisions of OECD Code shall not apply to
actions by United States).
212. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 130 (describing U.S. protectionist measures
and their effect on relations between United States and Western Europe during 1950s
and 1960s); Hearn, supra note 142, at 489-95 (discussing cargo reservation agreements
between United States and Latin American countries).
213. See CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 184-85 (relating history of container shipping).
The container originated in the U.S. trucking industry in the 1950s and gradually
spread to U.S. liner firms, and from there to the shipping companies of Europe and
Japan. Id. The advent of the container revolutionized the shipping industry. STEVENS,
supra note 40, at 99-101 (describing profound industry changes following introduction
of container shipping). General cargo ships carry bulk goods loaded in crates or comparatively small packages, whereas container shipping employs large steel boxes of uniform size, most commonly 8 x 8 x 20 ft and 8 x 8 x 40 ft. CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 185;
PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 343 (defining container as metal box most commonly
8 x 8 x 20 ft and 8 x 8 x 40 ft). The uniform size and form of containers largely
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1960s brought further profound changes to the world maritime
market. 2 14 To meet the challenges of increased protectionist
practices in shipping and of the adaptation to the highly capitalintensive container technology, the individual EC Member States
needed to combine their efforts and find a collective solution to
the problems facing the Member States' merchant fleets. 2 15 The
Community needed to develop a common maritime transport
policy, whose objective would be to further Community's interests in international maritime trade and promote the establishment of a strong and competitive EC fleet, while complying with
principles of shipping policy espoused by the U.N. Liner Code
and the OECD Code.2 16
simplifies loading and unloading and permits multimodal transportation by using the
same container on ships, trains, and trucks, thus breaking down the barrier between
land and sea. CAFRUNY, sup-a note 13, at 185. Another advantage of the containerization of shipping is the tremendous speed-up of loading and unloading and consequently of a ship's turn-around time. STEVENS, supra note 40, at 100. Container shipping, however, is highly capital-intensive. Id.; CAFRUNY, supra note 13, at 185.
214. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 49 (discussing effect of containerization
on strength and position of world's maritime industries).
215. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 14-15 (noting changes
in shipping industry as consequence of introduction of containers in shipping and
need for EC to respond to changing conditions in world maritime market); ROCHDALE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 409 (concluding that introduction of container technology
brought in 1970s changes in world shipping industry "probably no less significant than
the replacement in the nineteenth century of the wooden ship with that of iron, and of
sail by steam."). The introduction of container shipping, with its considerably high
capital investment, was a commercial threat to European shipowners. Id. By developing a common maritime policy, the individual Member States could reduce instability
in their shipping industries and better meet the challenges of the 1970s. See CAFRUNY,
supra note 13, at 10, 202 (looking at development of EC common maritime policy as
protective response to adverse changes in maritime market).
216. See Communication and Proposals by the Commission to the Council on Progress Towards a Common Transport Policy: Maritime Transport, COM(85)90 Final 1
(March 1985) [hereinafter 1985 Commission Progress Report] (expressing Commission's belief that "the Community has now reached a stage in the development of its
shipping policy which requires a more coherent approach."). A common EC shipping
policy would work toward the furtherance of the Community's trading and shipping
interests. Id. COM (85) 90 Final, at 1. Because of Member States' commitment to "the
free and open regime enshrined in the OECD Code," the creation of a common shipping policy and market should be based on the principles of free and open competition. Id. COM (85) 90 Final, at 16. See also Peter G. Xuereb, Transport Services and
External Policy, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 131, 131 (1990) (stating that for internal
market reasons, transport issues require coordinated stance). Such coordinated approach "is implicit in the idea of a single market and a unified Europe, and is of major
benefit to international cooperation." Id.; Greaves, supra note 2, at 120 (emphasizing
that it was essential for Community to adopt common maritime policy to improve its
maritime competitiveness).
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2. Legal Framework
EC Treaty provisions that bear directly on the Community
power to regulate maritime transport come from two major
sources. 2 17 The relevant general EC Treaty provisions concerning maritime transport include the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality,2 1 8 the freedom to provide services, 2 " and competition rules. 220 The specific acts dealing with
maritime transport derive from Article 84(2) of Title IV on trans221
port.
a. The Principle of Nondiscrimination
Article 6 of Part One of the EC Treaty, laying down the fundamental Community principles, prohibits any discrimination
on grounds of nationality. 222 The principle of nondiscrimination represents a fundamental postulate of the EC concept and
structure.2 23 Nondiscrimination and equal treatment of nationals of all Member states serve as a major unifying force in the
existence and functioning of the multinational European Community. 224 As a fundamental conceptual principle, nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality underlies each and every Com217. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 76 (describing legal
basis of EC measures on shipping); Greaves, supra note 2, at 12-21 (analyzing legal
framework for EC maritime action); CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 37
(presenting EC Treaty sources of rules governing EC transport policy).
218. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591 (prohibiting any
discrimination on grounds of nationality). Article 48 of the EC Treaty specifically applies the principle of nondiscrimination based on nationality to the free movement of
workers. See id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612 (providing that free movement of
workers "shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.").
219. Id. arts. 59-66, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-18 (setting forth rules governing freedom to provide services).
220. Id. arts. 85-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-32 (containing EC competition
rules).
221. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (stating that
Council may "decide whether, to watt extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea ... transport.").
222. Id. art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591 .
223. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 121 (examining fundamental principles and tenets of EC law).
224. See id. at 121 (describing role of principle of nondiscrimination in structure
and functioning of Community).
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25

munity act.2
The ECJ has explicitly ruled that the principle of nondis226
crimination applies to the field of a common transport policy.
With respect to maritime transport, in particular, the most influential case involving the principle of non-discrimination was the
French Merchant Seamen case.2 27 In that case, France argued that
Article 84(2) of the EC Treaty implied that the general provisions of the EC Treaty were inapplicable to sea transport in the
absence of a decision to the contrary by the Council. 228 The
Court of Justice rejected these arguments and ruled that, so long
as the Council has not decided otherwise, Article 84(2) excludes
sea and air transport from the rules of Title IV relating to the
Common Transport Policy. 229 The ECJ further ruled, however,
that, until the Council decides otherwise, sea and air transport
are subject to the same general EC Treaty rules as any other
mode of transport. 23 ° The general rules in question were those
225. See id. (noting that principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality
applies to all actions by EC institutions and to all EC activities).
226. SeeFrench Merchant Seamen, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 216 (holding
that free movement of workers and abolition of any discrimination based on nationality
apply to common transport policy and all modes of transport, including transport by
sea). The common transport policy is among the activities in which the Community
must engage according to Article 3 of the EC Treaty in order to establish a common
market and progressively approximate the economic policies of the Member States.
European Parliament v. EC Council, Case 13/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1513, 1584, 7 2, [1986]
1 C.M.L.R. 138, 192-93. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3 (f), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588
(requiring European Community to create common policy in sphere of transport as
part of measures establishing common market and economic and monetary union).
The common transport policy is the subject of Title IV of Part Two of the Treaty, the
part concerned with the "foundations of the Community." European Parliament, [1985]
E.C.R. at 1584,
2, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 192. The first Article under the Title on
transport, Article 74, lays down that the objectives of the EC Treaty concerning the
transport sector "shall be pursued by Member States within the framework of a common transport policy." EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 74, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623. Article 75 (1) provides that for the purpose of implementing Article 74 the Council must lay
down appropriate measures. Id. art. 75(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623-24.
227. French Merchant Seamen, [1974] E.C.R. at 371, 7 32, 33, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at
229 (making principle of nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality applicable to
maritime transport).
228. Id. at 368, 1 8, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 227. The French government maintained
that "the rules of the Treaty regarding freedom of movement for workers do not apply
to transport and, in any event, not to maritime transport so long as the Council has not
so decided under article 84(2) of the Treaty." Id.
229. Id. at 371, 7 32, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 229.
230. Id. at 371,
32, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 229. The ECJ emphasized that the
application of the rules for free movement of workers to the sphere of maritime transport "is not optional but obligatory for Member State." Id.
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relating to nondiscrimination. 23 ' The ECJ's decisions thus apof
plied the principles of nondiscrimination and free movement
232
workers, Articles 48 through 51, to maritime transport.
b. Freedom to Provide Services
Title III in Part Two of the EC Treaty contains the articles
relating to the freedom to provide services. 23 3 The principle of
nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality lies at the foundation of the freedom to provide services. 234 Article 61, however,
states that Title IV relating to transport shall govern the provision of services in the transport sector. 235 In European Parliament
v. EC Counci 2 36 ("European Parliament"), the ECJ ruled that because Article 61 (1) makes the freedom to provide transport serv231. French Merchant Seamen, [1974] E.C.R. at 373, 46, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 231.
The French Merchant Seamen Case held that by maintaining unamended Section 3(2) of
its 1926 Code du Travail Maritime (Merchant Seamen Code), France failed to fulfill its
obligations under article 48 of the EC Treaty, which requires nondiscriminatory treatment of workers. Id. at 374, 48, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 231. The French Code required
that at least seventy-five percent of the crew of a French ship be of French nationality.
Id. at 367, 3, [1974] E.C.R. at 226. Article 48 of the EC Treaty provides for the free
movement of workers of the Member States and prohibits any discrimination based on
nationality with respect to workers' employment, remuneration, or other conditions of
work. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 48(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. The French government argued that Article 48 did not apply to workers in the maritime transport sector,
not unless the Council has ruled otherwise under Article 84(2). French Merchant Seamen,
[1974] E.C.R. at 368, 8, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 227. France, thus, insisted that it had
not failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations with respect to the principle of nondiscrimination. Id.

232. Id. at 371,
33, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. at 229.
233. EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 59-66, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-18 (comprising
chapter on provision of services in Title III of Part Three of EC Treaty). Article 59
states that "restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be
...abolished." Id. art. 59, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-17. Article 60 defines services to
include activities of an industrial or commercial character, activities of craftsmen, and
activities of the professions. Id. art. 60, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617. Article 63 empowers
the Council to legislate in order to implement the principle of freedom to provide
services. Id. art. 63, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617-18.
234. See id. art. 60, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617 (dealing with right of establishment
permanently or temporarily for purpose of providing services). Article 60 further requires that the person who establishes himself in a Member State in order to provide
services in that Member State must be able to pursue his activity "under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals." Id.
235. Id. art. 61(1),[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617.
62, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205
236. European Parliament, [1985] E.C.R. at 1599,
(holding that freedom to provide services in transport is governed by Treaty provisions
on transport).
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ices subject to the rules of Articles 74-84 (the transport Title),237
free provision of services can be implemented in this sector only
238 The ECJ
by the introduction of a common transport policy.
pointed out, however, that the Council has very little discretion
with respect to the introduction of a common transport policy,
because the combined effect of Articles 59, 60, 61, concerning
the freedom to provide services, 23 9 and 75(1) (a) and (b), on the
implementation of a common transport policy, 240 determine the
results to be obtained. 241 The Council must adopt legislation es-

tablishing freedom to provide transport services in accordance
with the principle of nondiscrimination based on the nationality
of the person providing services.2 42

The Council's discretion

goes only toward the appropriate means necessary to achieve the
desired results.

243

c. Competition Rules
The competition rules apply to all economic activities, in237. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 74-84, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623-26 (constituting chapter on transport and laying down rules for achievement of common transport
policy).
238. European Parliament, [1985] E.C.R. at 1599,
62, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205
(asserting that "application of the principles governing freedom to provide services...
must . . .be achieved, according to the Treaty, by introducing a common transport
policy, and more particularly, by laying down common rules applicable to international
transport.")
239. SeeEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 59-61 [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-17. Article 59
requires the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community. Id. art. 59, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 616-17. Article 60 provides for equal treatment of
national and non-national providers of services within the Community. Id. art. 60,
(1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617. Article 61 states that freedom to provide transport services
shall be governed by the rules on transport. Id. art. 61, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617.
240. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 75(1) (a) and (b), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623-24
(stating that for purpose of implementing common transport policy, Council shall lay
down "(a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory
of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States;" and
"(b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services
within a Member State.").
241. See EuropeanParliament, [1985] E.C.R. at 1599, 64, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205
(holding that scope of obligation imposed on Council with respect to implementation
of common transport policy is "clearly defined by the Treaty."). The ECJ affirmed that
"[p] ursuant to Articles 59 and 60 the requirements of freedom to provide services include ... the removal of any discrimination against the person providing services based
on his nationality or the fact that he is established in a Member State other than that
where the services are to be provided." Id. at 1599,
64, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205.
242. Id. at 1599, 64, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205.
.243. Id. at 1600, 65, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 205-06.
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cluding maritime transport. 244 The EC Treaty competition rules
fall into two categories, rules that apply to undertakings 245 and
rules that apply to. government aids. 246 The shipping industry
24 7
has to comply with both types of rules.
Article 85 regulates market agreements 24 and Article 86
regulates market behavior 24 9 which may distort competition and
adversely affect trade between Member States. 250 To further the
implementation of Articles 85 and 86, the Council issued the
first Regulation in the area, Regulation 17/62,251 laying down
244. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-32 (setting
forth rules on competition); FrenchMerchant Seamen, [1974] E.C.R. at 371,
32, [1974]
2 C.M.L.R. at 229 (making the general Treaty principles applicable to maritime transport). By extending the general Treaty principles to maritime transport, the ECJ's
holding in the French Merchant Seamen case impliedly made the rules of competition
applicable to the maritime transport sector. BREDIM-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNos, supra
note 3, at 101.
245. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85-90, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-29 (laying
down competition rules governing activities of undertakings).
246. See id. arts. 92-94, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 630-32 (setting forth provisions concerning "[a]ids granted by States.").
247. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 125 (stating that maritime industry must respect
both state aids rules and rules governing market behavior of undertakings).
248. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (prohibiting all
agreements between undertakings that may distort competition within common market).
249. See id. art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27 (ruling out any abuse by one or
more undertakings of dominant position within common market). The ECJ has established the following definition of a dominant position:
The dominant position referred to in this Article [86] relates to a position of
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors,
customers and ultimately of its consumers.
United Brands v. EC Commission, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 277, 65, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. 429, 486-87. The ECJ has held that the first step in establishing the existence
of a dominant position is to define the relevant product or service market. Continental
Can v. EC Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, 247, 32, [1973] 1 C.M.L.R. 199,
226 (emphasizing importance of correctly defining relevant market in light of characteristics of products in question). The legal test for defining the relevant product or
service market is the interchangeability of the product or service concerned. Id. The
interchangeability of the products or services will depend on their physical characteristics, price, and use. See CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 118 (defining relevant
market). The interchangeability of products or services will ultimately depend on the
"characteristics of the products in question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent interchangeable
with other products." Continental Can, [1973] E.C.R. at 247, 32, [1973] 1 C.M.L.R. at
226.
250. EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85, 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
251. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 11 J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
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detailed rules of procedure for the Commission to follow in enforcing the EC competition rules. 52 Regulation 17/62 declared
void any agreement or behavior incompatible with the rules on
competition,2 5 3 and empowered the Commission to impose fines
for such infringements.2 54 Regulation 17/62 did not, however,
apply to transport.25 5 To account for transport, the Council had
62, at 87 [hereinafter Regulation 17/62] (setting forth first Council regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of EC Treaty).
252. Id. Article 11 empowers the Commission to obtain all information necessary
for the performance of its duties in enforcing EC competition rules. Id. art. 11, O.J.
Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 90. The Commission may, by decision, require the parties to
the agreement concerned to supply the necessary information. Id. The Commission
may impose fines for noncompliance with this requirement. Id. Under Article 14, the
Commission also has the power to carry out all necessary investigations into undertakings concerned, including the power to enter the premises of relevant undertakings to
gather information. Id. art. 14, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 91. Having determined
the facts, the Commission may take a decision to issue a negative clearance, terminate
an infringement, or grant exemptions. CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 240
(reviewing provisions of Regulation 17/62). See also Council Regulation 17/62, supra
note 251, arts. 2, 3, and 6, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88. Article 2 of Regulation
17/62 explains that "[u] pon application by the undertakings... concerned, the Commission may certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds
under Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the Treaty [concerning competition rules] for action on its part in respect of an agreement, decision or practice." Id. art. 2, O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88. Where the Commission finds that there is an infringement of
Article 85 or Article 86 of the EC Treaty, the Commission may require the undertakings
concerned to "bring such infringement to an end." Id. art. 3, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 195962, at 88. Article 6 of Regulation 17/62 empowers the Commission to grant exemptions pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EC Treaty. Id. art. 3, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,
at 88. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (providing for
exemptions from EC Treaty prohibition on agreements and practices infringing EC
competition rules). If a prohibited agreement "contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress" and
allows consumers "a fair share of the resulting benefit," the EC Treaty prohibition on
practices distorting competition does not apply to the agreement. Id. In order to qualify for the exemption, the undertaking- must also avoid imposing on the parties concerned "restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the objectives" of
the agreement and the provisions of the agreement must not eliminate competition
altogether "in respect of a substantial part of the products in question." Id.
253. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 251, art. 1, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 88
(asserting that any agreements, decisions, and practices violating Article 85 (1) and Article 86 of EC Treaty "shall be prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required.")
254. Id. arts. 15, 16, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 91-92 (laying down detailed
fine schedules Commission may impose on undertakings in infringement of EC competition rules).
255. See Council Regulation No. 141/62, 124J.O. 2751 (1962), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 291 [hereinafter Regulation 141/62] (exempting transport from application of Regulation 17/62). Article 1 of Regulation 141/62 states that "Regulation No
17 shall not apply to agreements, decisions or... practices in the transport sector which
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to issue Regulation 4056/86256 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to Maritime
25 7
Transport.
d. Transport Provisions
Article 3(f) of the EC Treaty requires the Community to
adopt a common transport policy as a means toward establishing
a common market. 25 8 Title IV of Part Two of the EC Treaty sets
forth specific transport provisions.2 5 9 Article 74 states that the
objectives of the Treaty with respect to transport shall be pursued within the framework of a common transport policy. 260 Article 75 requires the Council to lay down common rules applicable to international transport, as well as conditions under which
non-resident carriers may operate transport services within a
Member State and any other appropriate measures. 26 1 Article
84(1), however, makes the provisions of Title IV applicable to
transport by rail, road, and inland waterway, thus selecting maritime and air transport for special treatment. 26 2 Article 84(2) further states that the Council may decide whether, to what extent,
and by what procedure, appropriate provisions may by adopted
for these two types of transport.2 68 Because of the exemption of
maritime transport from the normal requirements of a common
transport policy, the European Community was slow in implementing the appropriate measures for bringing maritime transhave as their object or effect the fixing of transport rates and conditions, the limitation
or control of the supply of transport or the sharing of transport markets; nor shall it
apply to the abuse of a dominant position, within the meaning of Article 86 of the
Treaty, within the transport market." Id.. art. 1, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 291.
Regulation 141/62 further provided that the Council "shall adopt appropriate provisions in order to apply rules of competition to transport." Id. art. 2, 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 291.
256. Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, 0.J. L 378/4 (1986) (setting forth rules
for application of EC competition provisions to sea transport sector).
257. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 126 (analyzing application of EC competition
rules to transport by sea).
258. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(f), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589 (requiring Community to adopt common policy in sphere of transport in accordance with principles of
Article 2 laying down task of establishing common market).
259. Id. arts. 74-84, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623-26 (covering EC rules in respect of
transport).
260. Id. art. 74, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623.
261. Id. art. 75(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 623-24.
262. Id. art. 84(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
263. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
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264
port in line with the other modes of transport.

II. THE EC MARITIME LEGISLATION
265
Despite the strategic importance of maritime transport
and the regulations imposed by international conventions and
organizations such as UNCTAD, 26 6 the U.N. Liner Code, 2 67 and
OECD, Community activity with respect to adopting a common
maritime policy was minimal in the period between 1958 and
1985.268 An effective EC maritime policy was necessary to ensure
free and open access to cargoes for EC shipowners and to secure
fair competition on a commercial basis in the trades to, from,
and within the Community. 269 In view of the necessity for EC
action in the sea transport sector, in 1985, the Commission published a progress report 27 0 ("1985 Commission Progress Re271
port") on the Community common maritime transport policy.
Emphasizing the dependence of the European Community on
world trade and on the international maritime shipping market, 27 2 the Commission made a number of proposals 27 3 which
264. See BREDIMP-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 113 (referring to EC
measures on sea transport prior to 1985 as "far from constituting a common maritime
policy.").
265. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 119 (emphasizing need for Community to maintain efficient and competitive fleet capable of carrying out EC trade if Community is to
retain its status as world economic power); Commission Communication I, supra note 4,
COM (96) 84 Final, at 3 (reporting that in 1996, 90% of EC external trade and 30% of
intra-Community trade depended on maritime transport).
266. UNCTAD, supra note 76.
267. U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110.
268. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TzoANos, supra note 3, at 102-05 (assessing EC
initiatives in sea transport area between 1958-1985); CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note
204, at 41 (noting slow progress in implementing common transport policy prior to
1985); id. at 48 (noting insufficient EC action towards establishing common shipping
policy prior to 1985).
269. See CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 50-52 (specifying objectives of EC
common shipping policy); Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, pmbl., 0.J. L 378/1, at 1
(1986) (asserting need for application of freedom to provide services to maritime transport as necessary condition for securing adherence to commercial principles in external and intra-Community shipping services); Regulation 4058/86, supra note 24, pmbl.,
OJ. L 378/21, at 21 (1986) (stating need to coordinate EC action to safeguard free
access to cargoes by EC shipowners, particularly where "the competitive position of
Member States' merchant fleets or Member States' trading interests are adversely affected by cargo reservation to shipping companies of third countries.").
270. 1985 Commission Progress Report, supra note 216, COM(85)90 Final.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 7. The Commission stated:
[i]n view of the Community's dependence on world trade and the depen-
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became the basis of the 1986 Legislative Package.2 74 In 1992, the
Council adopted Regulation 3577/92275 which complemented
27 6
the 1986 Legislative Package.
A. The 1986 Legislative Package
The 1986 Legislative Package consisted of four acts marking
the first stage in the development of an EC common maritime
policy.27 7 The primary focus of the four legislative acts was the

threat to Community shipping interests from protectionist practices and measures of non-Member States. 278 The four acts of
dence of its shipping interests on international shipping markets... the maintenance of a multilateral and commercially orientated Community shipping
policy is still in the best interest of the Community's shipping industry, as well
as of its user industries, and is still the best way of achieving the objectives of
the Treaty.
Id.
273. Id. at 14-15. The thrust of the Commission's proposals was to provide an
overall concept for an EC shipping policy based on a philosophy of free trade, fair
competition, and promotion of the international competitive position of EC shipping.
Id.
274. See BIDIMA-SAvoPouLOU, supra note 3, at 113-27, 151 (analyzing main points
of Commission's proposals in 1985 Commission Progress Report and role of Commission's proposals in enactment of 1986 Legislative Package);, CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra
note 204, at 52-54 (stating that 1986 Legislative Package embodied principles contained
in Commission's proposals in 1985 Commission Progress Report).
275. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, O.J. L 364/7 (1992).
276. See id. pmbl., O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (defining application of principle of
freedom to provide services to maritime cabotage as purpose of Regulation 3577/92);
CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 130 (describing focus of 1986 Legislative Package to be relations with third-country shipowners). The 1986 Legislative Package did
not address the issue of cabotage. Id. .
277. See CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 54-55 (describing 1986 Legislative Package as first stage in development of EC shipping policy).
278. Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, pmbl., 0.J. L 378/1, at 1 (1986) (stressing
need "for effectively pursuing, in relation to third countries, a policy aiming at safeguarding the continuing application of commercial principles in shipping."); Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, pmbl., 0J. L 378/4, at 4 (1986) (stating need to adopt
Council regulation applying rules of competition to maritime transport); Regulation
4057/86, supra note 24, pmbl., OJ. L 378/14, at 14 (1986) (providing that because "the
competiiive participation of Community shipowners in international liner shipping is
adversely affected by certain unfair practices of shipping lines of third countries" it is
"necessary to lay down the procedures for those acting on behalf of the Community
shipping industry who consider themselves injured . . . by unfair pricing practices to
lodge a complaint."); Regulation 4058/86, supra note 24, pmbl., 0J. L 378/21, at 21
(1986) (observing that increasing number of countries resort to protecting their
merchant fleets and distort fair and free competition in shipping trade with EC Member States, and articulating need to safeguard free access to cargoes in maritime trade).
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the 1986 Legislative Package are Regulation 4055/86,279 Regulation 4056/86,280 Regulation 4057/86,281 and Regulation 4058/
86.282 The 1986 Legislative Package marked the first stage
in the
2 83
implementation of an EC common maritime policy.
1. Background to the 1986 Legislative Package
Because developments in the other transport sectors had
been equally slow, the European Parliament 28 4 ("Parliament")
brought action in 1983 against the Council for failure to act28 in
accordance with its obligations under the EC Treaty transport
provisions. 28 6 The ECJ ruled that the Council was under an obligation to introduce a common policy for transport, 287 particu279. Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/1 (1986).
280. Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/4 (1986).
281. Regulation 4057/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/14 (1986).

282. Regulation 4058/86, supra note 24,

OJ. L 378/21 (1986).

283. See COUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 53-54 (analyzing 1986 Legislative

Package as first stage toward EC common maritime policy).
284. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 137-44, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-79 (describing duties, role, and composition of European Parliament). The European Parliament
("Parliament") consists of representatives of the peoples of the EC Member States. Id.
art. 137, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676. The people of Member States directly elect Members of Parliament, whose duty is to represent the people rather than a Member State
government. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 65. In most areas of the law, the Council must consult with the Parliament before passing legislation. Id. at 80. Exceptions to
the rule that legislation requires the consultation of Parliament include "directives on
the free movement of capital with third states [EC Treaty art. 73c] and most measures
to be taken... in creating the [European Monetary Union]." Id. The Parliament may
also take part in the legislative process by means of the cooperation procedure and the
co-decision procedure. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189c, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694
(laying down cooperation procedure); id. art..189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694-95 (setting forth co-decision procedure). Under cooperation, the Council needs a unanimous
vote to override the Parliament's rejection of proposed legislation. Id. art. 189c, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 694. In co-decision, Parliament may, by absolute majority, reject a measure that the Council has approved. Id. art. 189b, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694-95.
285. See EC Treaty, supra note 1,art. 175, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 688 (providing that
"[s]hould the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in infringement
of this Treaty, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may bring an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established.").
286. See EuropeanParliament, [1985] E.C.R. at 1596, 48, [1986] 1 C.M.L:R. at 202
(asserting that under Article 175 "the Court must find that there has been an infringement of the Treaty if the Council or the Commission fails to act when under an obligation to do so.").
287. See id. at 1596, 49, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 202-03 (maintaining that "under the
system laid down by the Treaty it is for the Council to determine," as part of its obligation to introduce a common transport policy, "the aims of and means for implementing
a common transport policy.").
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larly with a view to the liberalization of transport and the facilitation of international traffic.2 8 8 In 1985, soon after the ECJ's decision in Eurapean Parliament,289 the Commission published a
progress report setting forth measures towards a common maritime transport policy.2 90 In light of the importance of maritime
transport for the EC economy and international trade relations,29 1 the Commission went on to make a number of proposals necessary to promote the Community's trade and shipping
interests. 29 2 These proposals became the basis of the 1986 legislative package, which marked the first stage towards a common
29 3
EC maritime transport policy.
2. Regulations of the 1986 Legislative Package
The focal point of the 1986 Legislative Package concerned
the threat to Community shipping interests from protectionist
practices and measures 294 of non-Member States that made it dif288. Id. at 1603, 80, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 208. The ECJ held that "in breach of
the Treaty the Council has failed to ensure freedom to provide services in the sphere of
international transport and to lay down the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services in a Member-State." Id.
289. European Parliament, [1985] E.C.R. 1513, [19861 1 C.M.L.R. 138 (holding
Council responsible for laying down measures to achieve common transport policy).
290. 1985 Commission Progress Report, supra note 216, COM(85) 90 Final.
291. See id. at 1-7 (presenting Commission's analysis of role of maritime transport
in EC economy and for achievement of EC Treaty objectives).
292. See id. Annexes (containing six proposals for draft Council regulations and
directives on maritime transport). The six legislative proposals included Draft Council
Regulation concerning coordinated action to safeguard free access to cargoes in ocean
trades ("Annex 11-"), Draft Council Regulation applying the principle of freedom to
provide services to maritime transport ("Annex 11-2"), Draft Council Decision amending Council Decision No. 77/587/EEC of 13/9/77 setting up a consultation procedure
on relations between Member States and third countries in shipping matters and on
action relating to such matters in international organizations ("Annex I-3"), Draft
Council Directive concerning a common interpretation of the concept of "national
shipping line ("Annex 114"), Amendments to the proposal for a Council Regulation
laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty to
maritime transport ("Annex 11-5"); Draft Council Regulation on unfair pricing practices
in maritime transport ("Annex 11-6"). Id. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra
note 3, at 121-27 (describing Commission's legislative proposals). The 1986 Legislative
Package left out the Commission's proposals contained in Annex 11-3 and Annex 11-4,
implementing the other four proposals. Id. at 151.
293. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 113-21 (tracing enact-

ment history of 1986 Legislative Package);

CLOUGH

& RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 62

(discussing background to 1986 Legislative Package).
294. See Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, art. 3-4, O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986)
(requiring gradual phasing out of existing cargo-sharing arrangements and prohibiting
any future cargo- sharing arrangements); Regulation 4057/86, supra note 24, art. 3, O.J.
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ficult to maintain a free-competition economy system.2 95 The
four regulations changed little with respect to intra-Community
29 6
policies concerning nondiscrimination against ships flying
non-national flags.29 7 Most significantly, the 1986 Legislative
Package did not deal with cabotage restrictions.298
a. Council Regulation 4055/86
Council Regulation 4055/86,299 one of the 1986 Legislative
Package acts, establishes the freedom to provide maritime transport services between Member States and between Member
States and third countries. 0 0 The purpose of Regulation 4055/
86 is to help EC shipowners defend against restrictions imposed
by third countries on shippers established in a Member State or
established in a non-Member State but controlled by an EC naL 378/14, at 15 (1986) (defining unfair pricing). Article 3 sets forth that unfair pricing
is
the continuous charging on a particular shipping route to, from or with the
Community of freight rates for selected or all commodities which are lower
than the normal freight rates . . . when such lower freight rates are made
possible by the fact that the shipowner concerned enjoys non-commercial advantages... granted by a State which is not a member of the Community.
Id.
295. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 130 (analyzing objectives and effect of 1986 Legislative Package); BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 115-121 (assessing
1986 Regulations and their impact on establishment of common market in maritime
services).
296. See MEYERS, supra note 13, at 133-34 (explaining that "when it is stated that a
ship is 'flying' or 'sailing under' a particular flag, what is meant is that the ship has the
nationality of the flag state.").
297. See CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 63 (summing up effect of 1986
Legislative Package on EC maritime policy); Greaves, supra note 2, at 130 (stating that
external relations with nonmember shipowners formed focus of 1986 Legislative Package).

298. See CLOUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 63 (referring to failure of Council to adopt measures regarding cabotage); BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra
note 3, at 153 (pointing out that 1986 Legislative Package "left the stumbling block of
cabotage" untouched).
299. Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, OJ. L 378/1 (1986).
300. See id. art. 1(1), O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986) (asserting application of "[fireedom
to provide maritime transport services between Member States and between Member
States and third countries."). Services between Member States concern the "carriage of
passengers or goods by sea between any port of a Member State and any port or offshore installation of another Member State." Id. art. 1 (4) (a), 0J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986).
Services between Member States and third-countries refer to the "carriage of passengers
or goods by sea between the ports of a Member State and ports or off-shore installations
of a third country." Id. art. 1(4)(b), 0J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986).
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tional and with ships registered in the Community.30 a Regulation 4055/86 benefits EC nationals regardless of country of establishment. 30 2 In order to further free access to maritime services between Member States and third countries, Regulation
4055/86 prohibits future cargo sharing agreements with nonthat exMember States. 303 Regulation 4055/86 also 30 requires
4
isting agreements be adjusted or phased out.
Regulation 4055/86 did not extend the freedom to provide
maritime services to services on cabotage routes.3 0 5 In this respect, the final version of Regulation 4055/86 adopted by the
301. See id. arts. 1(1), 1(2), O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986). Article 1(1) makes freedom
to provide maritime services applicable to "nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended." Id. Article 1(2) extends the freedom to provide maritime services to "nationals of the Member States established outside the Community and to shipping companies established outside the Community and controlled by nationals of a Member State,
if their vessels are registered in that Member State." Id.
302. Id.; see EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14 (defining
establishment as taking up and pursuing activities as self-employed person or setting up
and managing undertakings "under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by
the law of the country where such establishment is effected."). Article 52 provides for
the right of free establishment of "nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State." EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 52, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14.
Undertakings, for purposes of Article 52, are "companies or firms constituted under
civil or commercial law ... save for those which are nonprofitmaking." Id. arts. 52, 58,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14, 616.
303. See Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, art. 5, OJ. L 378/1, at 2-3 (1986)
(prohibiting "cargo-sharing arrangements in any future agreements with third countries."). Article 5 allows for an exception to the general prohibition of cargo-sharing
arrangements where Community liner ships would "not otherwise have an effective opportunity to ply for trade to and from the third country concerned." Id.
304. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 378/1, at 3 (1986) (stating that cargo-sharing arrangements
"contained in existing bilateral agreements concluded by Member States with third
countries shall be phased out or adjusted."). Article 4 of Regulation 4055/86 governs
the adjustment of existing cargo-sharing arrangements "not phased out in accordance
with Article 3." Id. art. 4, O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986). Where "trades [are] governed by
the United Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences... [existing cargo-sharing
agreements] shall comply" with the U.N. Liner Code and with the Community's obligations under Regulation 954/79. Id. art. 4(1)(a), O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986). Trade "not
governed by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences shall be adjusted as soon as possible." Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, art. 4(1) (b), OJ. L 378/
1, at 2 (1986).
305. See Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, art. 1(4)(a), O.J. L 378/1 at 2 (1986)
(limiting intra-Community shipping services that fall within ambit of Regulation 4055/
86 to "the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between any port of a Member State and
any port . . . of another Member State.") (emphasis added); CLOUGH & RANDOLPH,
supra note 204, at 63 (noting failure of Council to adopt measures regarding cabotage
services as part of freedom to provide services under Regulation 4055/86).
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Council differed from the Commission's proposals leading to
the 1986 Legislative Package. 30 6 Annex II-2 of the 1985 Commission Progress Report3 0 7 contained a draft Council Regulation applying the principle of freedom to provide maritime transport
services to the coastal trades of a Member State.3 8 Due to the
large divergence of opinion expressed at the Council deliberations in the course of adopting Regulation 4055/86,09 the Member States could not reach agreement on the sensitive issue of
cabotage in time for the adoption of the four-piece Legislative
Package of 1986.310 Because of the national defense implications of cabotage, 311 and because coastal services cover not only
the ordinary carriage of goods and passengers but also the profitable cruise business,3 1 2 cabotage soon became a major issue of
contention.3 1 3 Two approaches emerged during the delibera306. See 1985 Commission Progress Report, supra note 216, COM (85) 90 Final,
Annex 11-2, at 2-3 (containing proposal for abolishing restrictions in provision of maritime services by persons "established in a State of the Community other than that of the
person for whom the services are intended" including "the carriage of passengers or
goods by sea between ports in any one Member State (cabotage).").
307. Id.
308. See id. art. 3, at 3 (extending free provision of maritime services to cabotage
trade).
309. See BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU

& TzOANNOS,

supra note 3, at 152-68 (detailing

Council deliberations during 1985-86 leading to adoption of 1986 Legislative Package).
310. See id. at 152-54 (discussing positions Member States adopted in respect of
cabotage liberalization). France proposed the creation of a Community wide cabotage
whereby existing cabotage restrictions would be lifted for shipowners who are nationals
of Member States. Id. at 169. France's proposal did not gain enough support to be
accepted but caused the Council deliberations on cabotage restrictions to reach a deadlock. Id. at 152. In an attempt to break the deadlock, Germany proposed lifting cabotage restrictions in trade between a list of certain specified EC ports. Id. The list of
proposed specified ports included all ports in the Baltic, the North Sea, the British Isles,
and the Channel, as well as the continental ports in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece.
Id. at 169. When Germany's proposal did not succeed in helping the Member States
reach an agreement on cabotage, the Council decided to leave the liberalization of
cabotage services out of the scope of Regulation 4055/86. Id. at 153.
311. See PROTECTIONISM, supra note 10, at 113 (referring to strategic importance of
cabotage routes for maintaining regular national communications with remote and usually underdeveloped regions of a country); BREDIMA-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNOS, supra
note 3, at 158 (relating Greece's opposition to lifting cabotage restrictions because of
strategic position of Greek islands close to Turkey).
312. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6, O.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992) (granting special exemption from application of Regulation 3577/92 to cruise services, as
type of cabotage transport services).
313. See BREDIMA-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 151-68 (detailing reasons for exclusion of cabotage liberalization from Regulation 4055/86).
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tions. 314 The Southern European States, France, Italy, Greece,
Spain and Portugal, insisted on maintaining cabotage.3 15 The
countries of Northern Europe, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, and Denmark insisted on total and immediate opening up of cabotage services to carriers
flying a non-national flag.31 6
Moreover, even within the group of the Southern Member
States, reasons against the liberalization of cabotage services differed from country to country. 31 7 Greece, for example, defended cabotage restrictions on grounds of national security, especially in view of the location of its islands in close proximity to
Turkey. 3 18 France, on the other hand, proposed the creation of
an EC maritime space with no restrictions applying to ships flying Community flags. 3 19 The French proposal envisaged in essence a Community-wide coastal zone modeled on the U.S. system created by the Jones Act of 1920.20 The rest of the Member
States rejected the French proposal as incompatible with the EC
commitment to a liberal and anti-protectionist approach to maritime transport.3 2 1 Spain, Italy, and Portugal insisted on Community harmonization of regulations concerning seafarers' social benefits and terms of employment as a pre-condition to the
removal of cabotage restrictions.3 2 2 In the end, Member States'
opposing opinions with respect to free access to coasting trade
314. Id. at 158 (mentioning clear division between Mediterranean and Northern
Member States on issue of cabotage). The United Kingdom even threatened on several
occasions during the negotiations to impose cabotage restrictions around its coast, or to
proceed to the ECJ for a final decision of the controversy. Id.
315. Id. at 158-59.
316. Id. at 158.
317. See BEDniMA-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 158-59 (presenting
views on cabotage of individual Southern Member States).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 159 (discussing French proposals for EC policy on cabotage restrictions).
320. Id.; see 46 App. U.S.C. § 883, supra note 157, (reserving coastal trade for U.S.built, U.S.-owned and U.S.-manned vessels).
321. See BREDIMA-SAvoPouLoU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 159 (discussing
French position on cabotage). France proposed removing national restrictions between
Member States in favor of EC flags, not only for coastal services, but equally for all intraCommunity routes. Id. The other Member States rejected the French proposal because it contradicted the Community's general commitment to liberalism in the world
maritime market and the principles of the OECD Code. See OECD CODE, supra note
190, Annex A, at 59 n.. (setting forth maintenance of free circulation of shipping in
international trade as underlying principle of OECD Code).
322. B.EDIrA-SAvoPouLou & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 159.
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resulted in Regulation 4055/86 excluding the issue of cabotage.

3 23

b. Council Regulation 4056/86
The 1986 Legislative Package also contained Council Regulation 4056/86324 which set down rules for the application of EC
competition norms to maritime transport.3 25 Regulation 4056/
86 was the first Community act applying the rules of competition
to the transport sector. 2 6 It sought to find a balance between
the requirements of Council Regulation 954/79327 on Member
States' ratification of the U.N. Liner Code3 28 and undue distortion of the common maritime market. 329 In recognition of the
stabilizing role of conferences in ensuring reliable services to
33 0
shippers, Regulation 4056/86 provided for block exemptions
of liner conferences. 33 1 At the same time, Regulation 4056/86
323. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 137 (noting that due to conflict between Northern European Member States and Southern European Member States, cabotage issues
were withdrawn from 1986 Legislative Package).
324. Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/4 (1986).
325. See id. pmbl., O.J. L 378/4, at 4 (1986) (explaining that Regulation 4056/86
"should define the scope of the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty" to maritime transport).
326. Greaves, supra note 2, at 125. Regulation 141/62 made Regulation 17/62,
the first EC measure laying down rules of procedure for the Commission to follow in
enforcing EC competition laws, inapplicable to transport. Regulation 4056/86, pmbl.,
O.J. L 378/4, at 4 (1986).
327. Council Regulation 954/79, supra note 110, Oj. L 121/1 (1979) (concerning
Member States' ratification of, or accession to, U.N. Liner Code).
328. U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110.
329. See Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, pmbl., Oj. L 378/4, at 4 (1986) (stating that Regulation 954/79 "will result in the application of the [U.N. Liner] Code...
to a considerable number of conferences serving the Community... [and] ... Regulation [4056/86] should supplement the [U.N. Liner] Code or make it more precise"
and "take account of the necessity... to provide for implementing rules that enable the
Commission to ensure that competition is not unduly distorted within the common
market.").
330. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 145 n.52 (explaining that block exemption is
term commonly used for categorical exemptions in competition area). Block exemptions are exemptions which can be granted automatically to an agreement if the agreement falls within the terms of the relevant regulation. Id. at 126.
331. See Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, pmbl., O.J. L 378/4, at 4 (1986) (allowing block exemptions). The preamble asserts that:
provision should be made for block exemption of liner conferences; whereas
liner conferences have a stabilizing effect, assuring shippers of reliable services; whereas they contribute generally to providing adequate efficient scheduled maritime transport services and give fair consideration to the interests of
users; whereas such results cannot be obtained without cooperation that ship-
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empowered the Commission to carry out necessary investigations
into suspected infringements of the Community competition
rules by undertakings in the shipping industry.3 3 2 The Regulation also lays down procedural rules supporting the Commission's investigative powers. 33 Finally, the Regulation applies
only to international maritime transport services.
ping companies promote within conferences in relation to rates and, where
appropriate, availability of capacity or allocation of cargo for shipment, and
income.
Id. Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86 provides that "[a] greements... of all or part of the
members of one or more liner conferences are hereby exempted from the prohibition
of Article 85(1) of the Treaty... when they have as their objective the fixing of rates
and conditions of carriage" of goods. Id. art. 3, O.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986). Article 4 of
Regulation 4056/86, however, makes the exemption of Article 3 subject to the condition that the agreements "shall not, within the common market, cause detriment to
certain ports, transport users or carriers by applying for the carriage of the same goods
... rates and conditions of carriage which differ according to the country of origin or
destination or port of loading or discharge, unless such rates or condditions [sic] can
be economically justified." Id. art. 4, O.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986). Regulation 4056/86
also provides that agreements "between transport users, on the one hand, and conferences, on the other hand . . . concerning the rates, conditions and quality of liner
services... are hereby exempted from the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the
Treaty." Id. art. 6, O.J. L 378/4, at 7 (1986).
332. Id. art. 18, O.J. L 378/4, at 11 (1986) (empowering Commission to "undertake all necessary investigations into undertakings and associations of undertakings.").
The Commission's investigating powers include the right to "examine the books and
other business records; to take copies of or extracts from the books and business
records; to ask for oral explanations on the spot; [and] to enter any premises, land and
vehicles of undertakings." Id. Article 18 further requires officials of the "competent
authority of the Member State in whose territory the investigation is to be made... [to]
assist the officials of the Commission in carrying out their duties." Id.
333. See id. art. 10, O.J. L 378/4, at 9 (1986) (stating that Commission shall initiate
procedures to terminate any infringement of provisions of Articles 85(1) and 86 of EC
Treaty while acting on its own initiative or on complaint by Member States, or natural
or legal persons claiming legitimate interest); art. 16, O.J. L 378/4, at 10 (1986) (authorizing Commission to "obtain all necessary information from the Governments and
competent authorities of the Member States and from undertakings and associations of
undertakings."). When sending a request for information to "an undertaking or association of undertakings, the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the
request to the competent authority of the Member state in whose territory the seat of
the undertaking ... is situated." Id. Article 16 also requires the Commission to state, in
its request, the legal basis and the purpose of the request, as well as the applicable
penalties. Id. See also id. art. 18, O.J. L 378/4, at 11 (1986) (detailing steps Commission
may take in carrying out its investigation); art. 19, O.J. L 378/4, at 11 (1986) (providing
for fines Commission may impose on undertakings which "intentionally or negligently
... supply incorrect or misleading information" or "produce the required books or
other business records in incomplete form during investigations."). The Commission
may also impose fines on undertakings which infringe Article 85(1) or Article 86 of the
EC Treaty. Id. at 12.
334. See id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 378/4, at 6 (1986) (making Regulation 4056/86 appli-
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c. Council Regulation 4057/86
The third Council Regulation in the 1986 Legislative Package deals with unfair pricing practices of third countries.3 5 The
purpose of Regulation 4057/86336 is to lay down the procedure
to be followed in response to unfair pricing practices by third
country shipowners engaged in international cargo liner ship338
ping. 1 7 Regulation 4057/86 thus covers only liner shipping.
It sets out complaint procedures for those acting on behalf of
the Community shipping industry who consider themselves injured or threatened by unfair pricing practices.3 3 9
cable "only to international maritime transport services from or to one or more Community ports.").
335. See Regulation 4057/86, supra note 24, art. 1, O.J. L 378/14, at 15 (1986)
(stating objective of Regulation 4057/86). Article I asserts that the objective of Regulation 4057/86 is to lay down procedure to
be followed in order to respond to unfair pricing practices by certain third
country shipowners engaged in international cargo liner shipping, which
cause serious disruption of the freight pattern on a particular route to, from
or within the Community and cause or threaten to cause major injury to Community shipowners operating on that route.
Id.
336. Id. O.J. L 378/14 (1986).
337. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 378/14, at 15 (1986) (describing purpose of Regulation
4057/86).
338. Id.
339. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 378/14, at 16 (1986) (allowing any injured party to lodge
written complaint). An injured party may submit a complaint directly to the Commission or to a Member State, which should forward the complaint to the Commission. Id.
The complaint must contain sufficient eviderice of the existence of the unfair practice
in question and the resulting injury. Id. If there is sufficient evidence to justify initiating a proceeding, the Commission shall commence an investigation at Community
level, acting in cooperation with the Member States. Id. art. 7(1), OJ. L 378/14, at 16
(1986). The investigation should cover both unfair pricing practices and the resulting
injury. Id. In the course of its investigation the Commission "shall seek all the information it deems necessary" from the Member States and where necessary "shall .. carry
out investigations in third countries, provided that the firms concerned give their consent and the government of the country in question has been officially notified and
raises no objections." Id. art. 7(2), O.J. L 378/14, at 16 -17 (1986). The Commission
may hear the interested parties. Id. art. 7(5), O.J. L 378/14, at 17 (1986). "Furthermore, the Commission shall, on request, give the parties directly concerned an opportunity to meet" and present their views. Id. art. 7(6), O.J. L 378/14, at 17 (1986). If the
investigation reveals that "protective measures are unnecessary, then, where no objection is raised within the Advisory Committee ....the proceeding shall be terminated."
Id. art. 9, O.J. L 378/14, at 18 (1986). The Advisory Committee will consist of representatives of each Member State, with a representative of the Commission as Chairman.
Id. art. 6, OJ. L 378/14, at 16 (1986). Finally,
[w] here investigation shows that there is an unfair pricing practice, that injury
is caused by it and that the interests of the Community make Community in-
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d. Council Regulation 4058/86
The last act in the 1986 Legislative Package concerns coordinated action to safeguard free access to cargoes in ocean
trades. 34' Regulation 4058/86,341 which is an anti-protectionist
measure,342 strives to ensure a freely competitive environment in
the international maritime market, particularly in the dry and
liquid bulk trades. 343 Because third countries are increasingly
restricting access to bulk cargoes, 34 the Community should be
able to provide for coordinated action by Member States to
counter the adverse effects of these restrictive practices on the
EC merchant fleets. 3 45 Regulation 4058/86 respectively lays
down the mechanism of coordinated action against third countries.34 ' The coordinated action by Member States may range
tervention necessary, the Commission shall propose to the Council, after the
consultations [within the Advisory Committee] provided for in Article 6, that
it introduce a redressive duty. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall
take a Decision within two months.
Id. art. 11, 0.J. L 378/14, at 19 (1986). Redressive duties "shall be imposed on the
foreign shipowners" resorting to unfair pricing and "[p]ermission to load or discharge
cargo in a Community port may be made conditional upon the provision of security for
the amount of the duties." Id. art. 13, 0.J. L 378/14, at 19 (1986).
340. Regulation 4058/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/21 (1986).
341. Id.
342. See id. pmbl., 0.J. L 378/21, at 21 (1986) (asserting need to enable Community to take coordinated action by Member States "if the competitive position of Member States' merchant fleets or Member States' trading interests are adversely affected by
cargo reservation to shipping companies of third countries.").
343. See id. pmbl., 0.J. L 378/21, at 21 (1986) (explaining that there is increasing
tendency on part of third counties to restrict access to bulk cargoes, which poses serious
threat to "the freely competitive environment .. . in the bulk trades."). Regulation
4058/86 seeks to affirm the Member States' commitment to a freely competitive environment "as being an essential feature of the dry and liquid bulk trades." Id. Regulation 4058/86 further expresses the Member States' conviction that the introduction of
cargo-sharing arrangements in the bulk trades "will have a serious effect on the trading
interests of all countries by substantially increasing transportation costs." Id. The purpose of Regulation 4058/86, therefore, is to provide for a procedure enabling the Member States to take coordinated action against third countries restricting free access by
shipping companies of Member States to the transport of bulk cargoes and any other
cargo in tramp services, or of passengers. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 378/21, at 21 (1986). Regulation 4058/86 also provides for Member States' coordinated action to counter action
by third countries restricting access by Community ships to liner trades, where the liner
trades operate outside the U.N. Liner Code, or if within the U.N. Liner Code, the restrictive action by third countries is not in accordance with the provisions of the U.N.
Liner Code. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See id. art. 3, O.J. L 378/21, at 22 (1986) (setting forth that Member State may
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from diplomatic. representation to the third counties concerned,347 to counter- measures... directed at the shipping company or companies of the third countries concerned.34 9
3. Aftermath
Although the 1986 Legislative Package did not address all
aspects of an EC common shipping policy, it marked an important first stage on the way to a common maritime market.3 5 ° The
Community had yet to address the sensitive issue of cabotage
before establishing a single EC shipping market.3 5 1 The split between the Northern Member States, supporting immediate liberalization of cabotage, and the Southern Member States, opposing the lifting of cabotage restrictions, stood in the way to free
intra-Community maritime services.15 2 Striving to bring the mar-

itime market up in line with the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992, 35a in 1989 the Commission submitted to
request Commission for coordinated action). The Commission shall make the appropriate recommendations or proposals to the Council, and the Council may decide on
the appropriate coordinated action. Id. If the Council "has not adopted the proposal
on coordinated action within a period of two months, Member States may apply national measures unilaterally or as a group.' Id. art. 6, 0.J. L 378/21, at 22 (1986). In
case of urgency Member States may take unilateral national measures even within the
two-month period before the Council has made a decision. Id.
347. Id. art. 4(1)(a), 0.J. L 378/21, at 22 (1986).
348. See id. art. 4(1)(b), 0.J. L 378/21, at 22 (1986) (describing counter-measures
as consisting, separately or in combination, of "the imposition of an obligation to obtain a permit to load, carry or discharge cargoes" or "the imposition of a quota .
taxes or duties.").
349. Id.
350. See COUGH & RANDOLPH, supra note 204, at 53-54 (referring to 1986 Legislative Package as first stage toward EC common maritime policy); Xuereb, supra note 216,
at 136 (describing 1986 Legislative Package as "a major breakthrough in maritime policy.").
351. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 133 (analyzing EC maritime policy in post-1986
Legislative Package period)l; Cabotage: ProgressMade but Problems Still Remain, EUROPE
INFORMATION SERVICE, Mar. 1, 1991, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Transport Europe
File [hereinafter Cabotage: ProgressMade but Problems Still Remain] (explaining that cabotage proved problematic issue and pointing need to introduce cabotage measures in
order to improve competitivity of EC fleet).
352. See Cabotage: Progress Made but Problems Still Remain, supra note 351 (noting
continuing opposing positions of Northern and Southern Member States on liberalization of cabotage).
353. See Cabotage: Italians Present Council with Compromise Pater, EUROPE INFORMATION SERVICE, Mar. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transport Europe File
[hereinafter ItaliansPresent Council] (reporting that Commission "envisage[d] bringing
in the first stage of a liberalized maritime cabotage market at the end of 1993, a year
after the introduction of the Single Market.").
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the Council a proposal complementing the 1986 Legislative
Package.3 5 4 The 1989 Commission proposal became the basis of
Regulation 3577/92. 35 5
B. The 1992 Council Regulation 3577
The Single European Act of 1987356 ("SEA") set the internal
market program in motion as a vehicle toward greater economic
and political integration of the European Community.3 57 The
SEA envisioned a European Community without internal frontiers and the adoption of 279 new legislative measures designed
to achieve the full integration of the goods, services, and capital
markets by the end of 1992.358" The general Community movement toward closer economic integration and greater political
union 359 served as a major impetus towards a more comprehensive common EC maritime policy.36 The purpose of Regulation
3577/92 is to remove restrictions on the provision of maritime
transport services on cabotage routes.3 6 1 Regulation 3577/92
marked the second stage on the way to an EC common maritime
policy. 36 2 In the aftermath of Regulation 3577/92, as of June

1997, the Northern European Member States had completely
opened up both mainland36 3 and island3 6 4 cabotage, while the
354. See Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Applying the Principle of
Freedom to Provide Services to Maritime Transport within Member States, J.O. C 263/
17 (1989), amended by OJ. C 73/17 (1991) (applying principle of freedom to provide
services to cabotage).
355. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 24, pmbl., O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (acknowledging amended proposal of Commission as foundation for purpose and policy
of Regulation 3577/92).
356. SEA, supra note 1. Article 13 of the SEA defined the internal market as "an
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured." Id. art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 7(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 747.
357. See Goebel, supra note 1, at 1101 (describing impact of SEA on Community).
358. See Goebel, supra note 1, at 1101 (discussing changes in intra-Community relations and EC institutions that SEA introduced).
359. See id. (referring to SEA as first stage on road to greater political and constitutional union).
360. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TzOANNOS, supra note 3, at 205 (stating that process toward achievement of internal market in 1992 would inevitably trigger new developments in maritime field).
361. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, pmbl, O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (defining application of principle of freedom to provide services to maritime cabotage as
purpose of Regulation 3577/92).
362. See Greaves, supra note 2, at 128-38 (referring to pending EC legislation on
issue of cabotage as next stage in development of EC maritime policy).
363. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 2(1)(a), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992)
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Southern European Member States had lifted restrictions on
3 65
mainland cabotage only.
1. Background
The SEA set December 31, 1992, as the target date to
achieve the internal market. 3 66 The SEA also facilitated Community decision-making by permitting the Council to act by a qualified majority vote.1 67 Article 16(5) of the SEA 6 8 also changed
(specifying meaning of mainland cabotage as "the carriage of passengers or goods by
sea between ports on the mainland of one and the same Member State without calls at
islands.").
364. See id. art. 2(1)(c), OJ. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (designating island cabotage as
"the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between ports... on the mainland and on
one or more of the islands of one and the same Member State, or [between] ports...
on the islands of one and the same Member State.").
365. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 20-24 (reviewing effect of Regulation 3577/92 on maritime services on cabotage routes within
Member States).
366. See SEA, supra note 1, art. 13, O.J. L 169/1, at 7(1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at
747 (asserting that "[tihe Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992.").
367. See Goebel, supra note 1, at 1102 (pointing out that by permitting Council to
act by qualified majority vote, SEA facilitated adoption of legislation to achieve internal
market). The basic rule with regard to voting in the Council is that the Council acts by
a majority of its members, except when the EC Treaty provides otherwise. MATHIJSEN,
supra note 1, at 52 (reviewing voting procedure in Council); EC Treaty, supra note 1,
art. 148(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680 (asserting that "[s]ave as otherwise provided in
this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members."). Because most EC
Treaty provisions do provide otherwise, the general rule with respect to the Council's
voting procedure is to act by qualified majority or by unanimity. MATHIJSEN, supra note
1, at 52-53. For purposes of the qualified majority voting procedure the votes of the
members of the Council are weighted. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 148(2), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 680. Article 148(2) requires that where the Council acts by a qualified
majority vote, "the votes of the members shall be weighted as follows:"
Belgium
Denmark

5
3

Germany

10

Greece
5
Spain
8
France
10
Ireland
3
Italy
10
Luxembourg
2
Netherlands
5
Portugal
5
United Kingdom
10
Id. These numbers are set in an attempt to take into account each state's population
and economic power. Goebel, supra note 1, at 1122 (analyzing qualified majority voting
system). Out of a total of 76, at least 54 votes in favor are required for the adoption of
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the voting procedure under Article 84(2) of the EC Treaty concerning Council action on sea and air transport. 369 The
amended Treaty provision permitted the Council to act by quali3 70
fied majority instead of the previously required unanimity.
The Council could now adopt legislative decisions with fifty-four
votes out of a total of seventy-six.3 71 The internal market objective, coupled with the new voting rules, eventually resulted in
Council Regulation 3577/92372 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member
States.3 73
an act when the Council is acting on a proposal from the Commission. EC Treaty, supra
note 1, art. 148(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 681. If the Council is not acting on a proposal
from the Commission, there is the additional requirement that eight Member States
must vote in favor of the measure. Id.; MATHIJSEN, supra note 1, at 53. After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden on January 1, 1995, Article 148(2) was respectively
amended, so that now a qualified majority vote requires 62 out of a total of 87 votes,
and if the Council is not adopting a proposal from the Commission, the 62 votes must
come from at least ten members. See Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of
the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European Union is
Founded, art. 15, O.J. C 241/21, at 24 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Act of Accession]
(amending EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 148(2)); Council Decision of 1 January 1995,
art. 8, o.J. L 1/1, at 3 (1995) (adjusting instruments concerning accession of new Member States to European Union); 1994 Act of Accession, supra, art. 2, O.J. C 241/21, at 21
(1994) (delegating power to Council, acting unanimously, to adjust these instruments if
any applicant state did not ratify Act of Accession). Because the referendum in Norway
proved negative, Norway ultimately declined to join the EU. Goebel, supra note 1, at
1093, 1123 (discussing 1995 enlargement). Following the SEA, qualified majority voting became the usual mode of adopting most legislation to attain the internal market,
protect consumers or the environment, harmonize visa policies, education, and health
measures. Id. at 1121. Unanimity typically is required when the Council, acting on a
proposal from the Commission, wants to adopt an act which constitutes an amendment
to that proposal. EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 189a(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 694.
368. SEA, supra note 1, art. 16(5), O.J. L 169/1, at 7, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 748
(stating that "[i]n Article 84(2) of the [EC] Treaty, the term 'unanimously' shall be
replaced by 'by a qualified majority."').
369. Id.; EC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626 (permitting
Council, acting by qualified majority, to decide whether, to what extent, and by what
procedure to adopt measures for sea and air transport).
370. SEA, supra note 1, art. 16(5), O.J. L 169/1, at 7, [11987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 748; EC
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626.
371. See EC Treaty,, art. 148(2), supra note 1, art. 148(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 681
(setting forth number of votes necessary for measures requiring qualified majority
vote).
372. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, OJ. L 354/7 (1992).
373. See id. pmbl., OJ. L 354/7, at 7 (1992) (asserting that abolition of restrictions
on provision of maritime transport services within Member States is necessary for establishment of internal market); BREDIMA-SAVOPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 205
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2. Provisions of Council Regulation 3577/92
The purpose of Regulation 3577/92 is to abolish restrictions
on the provision of maritime transport services on cabotage
routes, 3 74 thereby eliminating another barrier towards the
achievement of the internal market. 375 Free access to cabotage
routes will also ensure adequate and regular transport to, from,
and.between islands. 376 The freedom to provide cabotage services applies to Community shipowners operating vessels registered in, and flying the flag of any Member State,37 7 provided
that these ships comply with all conditions for carrying out cabotage in the State of registry, or flag State.3 78 Thus, if a vessel is
capable of carrying out adequate cabotage services in the flag
State, it is deemed fit for that purpose in any Member State. 79
Within the meaning of Regulation 3577/92, cabotage covers services normally provided for remuneration 8 0 and includes
mainland cabotage, off-shore supply services,3 8 1 and island cabotage.3 8 2 The preamble to Regulation 3577/92 posits that the implementation of the freedom with respect to cabotage services
should be gradual and not necessarily carried out in a uniform
fashion for all services concerned.3 8 3 Specifically, the implemen(discussing expected effect of qualified voting procedure and of goal of achieving internal market by end of 1992 on EC maritime policy).
374. See id. pmbl, O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (describing purpose of Regulation
3577/92 to be application of principle of freedom to provide services to maritime cabotage).
375. See id. (stating that abolition of restrictions on provision of maritime cabotage
services is necessary for establishment of internal market).
376. Id.
377. Id. (stating that "the beneficiaries of [the] freedom [to provide services
within Member States] should be Community shipowners operating vessels registered
in and flying the flag of a Member State whether or not it has a coastline."). Regulation
3577/92 uses "maritime transport within Member States" and "maritime cabotage" as
interchangeable expressions. Id.
378. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 1(1), O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992). The
application of the provision of Article 1 (1) was temporarily suspended until December
1996. Id. art. 1(2), O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992).
379. Id.
380. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 2(1), O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992)
(defining maritime transport services within Member State).
381. Id. art. 2(1) (b), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (referring to off-shore supply services as "the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between any port in a Member State
and installations on the continental shelf of that Member State.").
382. Id. art. 2(1)(c), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (defining services within scope of
Regulation 3577/92).
383. Id. pmbl., O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (asserting that "the implementation of...
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tation of Regulation 3577/92 for maritime services carried out in
the Mediterranean and along the coast of Spain, Portugal, and
France was temporarily suspended until January 1, 1995 for
cruise services, 3 8 until January 1, 1997 for transport of strategic
goods,38 5 and until January 1, 1999 for regular passenger and
ferry services. 3 8 6 Island cabotage in the Mediterranean and to
the French islands along the Atlantic coast was also exempted
until January 1, 1999.387 Greece was given a special right not to
implement the Regulation until January 1, 2004.388
In order to secure reliable and regular transport to, from
and between islands, Article 4 of the Regulation allows Member
States to conclude public service contracts389 or impose public
service obligations3 ' 0 as a condition for the provision of cabotage
services to or between islands.3 91 The fundamental Community
principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality underlies the Member States' right to conclude public service contracts or impose public service obligations. 9 2 All Community
shipowners receive equal treatment with respect to public con[the] freedom [to provide services within Member States] should be gradual and not
necessarily provided for in a uniform way for all services concerned, taking into account
the nature of certain specific services and the extent of the effort that certain economies in the Community showing differences in development will have to sustain.").
384. Id. art. 6(1), 0.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992).
385. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art.6(1), 0J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992). Article 6(1) designates oil, oil products, and drinking water as strategic goods. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. art. 6(2), 0J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992). Article 6(2) also grants an exemption
untilJanuary 1, 1999, to cabotage services to the Canary, Azores, and Madeira archipelagoes, and to the North African seaports of Ceuta and Melilla. Id.
388. Id. art. 6(3), OJ. L 364/7, at 9 (1992). Article 6(3) states that "[f]or reasons
of socio-economic cohesion, the ... [exemption from the implementation of Regulation 3577/92] shall be extended for Greece until 1 January 2004 for regular passenger
and ferry services." Id.
389. See id. art. 2(3), 0.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (defining public service contract as
a contract concluded between the competent authorities of a Member State and a
Community shipowner in order to provide the public with adequate transport services."). Such contracts may include fixed standards of continuity, regularity, capacity
and quality of services, or transport services at specified rates and subject to specified
conditions for certain categories of passengers or routes. Id.
390. See id. art. 2(4), 0.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (explaining public service obligations to mean obligations which Community shipowner would not assume "if he were
considering his own commercial interest.").
391. Id. art. 4, O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992).
392. Id. Article 4 states that "[wlhenever a Member State concludes public service
contracts or imposes public service obligations, it shall do so on a non-discriminatory
basis in respect of all Community shipowners." Id.
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tracts and public service obligations.3 9 3
Regulation 3577/92 also grants Community shipowners the
right of temporary establishment in the Member State where a
shipowner from another Member State provides maritime cabotage services.39 4 The Treaty principle of freedom to provide services39 is thus explicitly made applicable to the maritime cabotage sector.39 6 Host Member States shall afford providers of
coastal services from other Community countries the same con3 97
ditions as those imposed on their own nationals.
3. Aftermath
Regulation 3577/92, marking the second stage in the development of an EC common maritime policy, removed yet another
barrier to free maritime trade by opening up the Member States'
coastal services to Community shipowners irrespective of their
country of origin. 9 8 Despite the temporary derogations concerning island cabotage in the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic coast of Spain, Portugal, and France, Regulation 3577/92
started the process of considerably liberalizing the maritime
transport to carry goods and passengers to, within, and from the
Community. 39 9 Moreover, the ECJ has narrowly interpreted the
393. Id.
394. Id. art. 8, O.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992).
395. See EC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 52, 60, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-14, 617
(dealing with right of establishment permanently or temporarily for provision of services); European Parliament v. EC Council, Case 13/83, [1985] E.C.R. at 1599,
62,
[1986] 1 C.M.L.R. at 204-05 (holding Title III articles on freedom to provide services
inapplicable to transport services in absence of legislation introducing common transport policy and implementing Title III rules in transport sector).
396. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 8, O.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992) (asserting that "a person providing a maritime transport service may, in order to do so,
temporarily pursue his activity in the Member States where the service is provided,
under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.").
397. Id.
398. See id. pmbl., O.J. L 364/7, at 7 (1992) (making Community shipowners beneficiaries of freedom to provide services on cabotage routes); id. art. 2(2), O.J. L 364/7,
at 8 (1992) (defining Community shipowners as nationals of "a Member State established in a Member State .. .; or nationals of a Member State established outside the
Community or shipping companies established outside the Community and controlled
by nationals of a Member State, if their ships are registered and fly the flag of a Member
State.").
399. See Commission Report I, supra note 28, COM (95) 383 Final, at 2-7 (discussing legislative developments in Member States pursuant to Regulation 3577/92, and
overall effect of liberalized cabotage by sector and by Member State, for 1993-94 period); Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 4-26 (discussing
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exemptions from the requirements of the Regulation.4 °°
a. Re Port Dues
In Re Port Dues,4 ' France claimed that because Article 6 of
Regulation 3577/92 excluded French cabotage from the freedom to provide services until January 1, 1999, it had the right to
set fare rules concerning cabotage routes different from the
rules covering intra-Community transport. 4° 2 Under the French
Code governing maritime ports4 0 3 a charge was levied on each
passenger disembarking, embarking or trans-shipping in the
ports of France.4 °4 In the case of transport between two national
ports, passengers had to pay only on boarding for departure.4 °5
In the case of vessels traveling to or from another Member State,
passengers had to pay twice, both on embarkation and disembarkation.4 °6 In addition, passengers arriving from, or leaving for
another Member State paid rates higher than those traveling on
purely domestic routes. 40 7 The Commission respectively
new legislative developments in individual Member States in the 1995-96 period, socioeconomic effect of liberalized cabotage for period concerned, and anticipated impact
on liberalization of island cabotage).
400. See Re Port Dues: EC Commission v. France, Case 381/93, [1994] E.C.R. I5145, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 485 (holding that temporary exemption from implementation
of Regulation 3577/92 does not permit Member State enjoying exemption to apply
rules differentiating between intra-Community maritime transport and internal maritime transport).
401. Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5145, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 485.
402. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5153211-23, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 492-93 (presenting French argument). France ar54,
gued that the freedom to provide services consisted of the requirement to abolish "all
discrimination against a person providing a service on the grounds of his nationality or
the fact that he is established in a Member State other than that in which the service
21, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 493. Because the French
must be provided." Id. at 1-5153,
fare rules treated all shipowners equally, irrespective of the country of registry, France
22,
insisted that it did not violate the freedom to provide services. Id. at 1-5153,
[1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 493. France further asserted that the principle of freedom to
provide services in the maritime transport sector "did not mean that intra-Community
transport and internal transport cannot be governed by different rules." Id. at 1-5154,
23, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R at 493.
403. Decree No. 92-1089 of 1 October 1992, J.O., 7 October 1992.
2, [1995]2 C.M.L.R. at 499.
404. Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5161,
5, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500.
405. Id. at 1-5165,
406. Id.
3, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 499 (detailing charges on various
407. See id. at 1-5164,
routes to and from French ports). For example, the charge for passengers bound for a
continental French port or Corsica was 8.28 FF, for passengers arriving from or travel-
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charged France with violating Council Regulation 4055/8608 applying the freedom to provide maritime transport services between Member States.4" 9 The Commission maintained that by
collecting different fees, depending on the country of destination or origin of the trip, the French authorities distinguished
between transport services within France and transport services
to or from another Member State, treating national transport
services more favorably.4 10 According to the Commission,
France was thus creating an impediment to the free provision of
services in intra-Community maritime trade.41 1
The French Government maintained that because the rules
governing the charges levied applied equally to all operators,
whether or not French nationals, there was no discrimination
between French operators and operators from other Member
States in intra-Community service to or from a French port.4 1 2
France contended that the fact that operators on intra-Community routes had to pay higher charges than operators servicing
ing to a port of the British Isles or the Channel Islands - 17.52 FF, and for passengers
arriving or traveling for any other European port - 21.01 FF. Id.
408. Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/1 (1986).
409. See Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5166,
6, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500 (explaining Commission's position that "even if the French rules do not discriminate on
the basis of the nationality of the provider of the transport services in question," they
violate Regulation 4055/86 "owing to the fact that they distinguish between transport
services within France and those performed to or from another Member State."). See
also Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, art. 1(1), O.J. L 378/1, at 2 (1986) (applying
principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member
States).
410. Id. at 1-5165,
5, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500. The Commission found the
French system of charges discriminatory. Id.
411. Id. at 1-5166, 1 6, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500.
412. Id. at 1-5166, 1 8, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 501. France argued that Regulation
4055/86 did not fully implement the freedom to provide services in maritime transport,
"inasmuch as it concerns only maritime transport between Member States and between
Member States and third countries and not ... maritime cabotage." Id. at 1-5166, 7,
[1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500. France further stressed that Article 6(1) of Regulation 3577/
92 granted France exemption from implementing the freedom to provide services to
cabotage transport. Id. According to the French government, therefore, "the observance by France of the rules concerning the freedom to provide services must be assessed separately for each of these two types of services." Id. at 1-5166-67, 1 8, [1995] 2
C.M.L.R. at 500-01. France insisted that there was no discrimination as between French
operators and operators from other Member States in intra-Community transport to or
from a French port, where the same fare rules applied to both. Id. at 1-5167, 1 8,
[1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 501. As for cabotage services, there was no discrimination either,
because "all operators from the other Member States are placed in the same situation
with regard to the applicable French legislation." Id.
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cabotage routes, for the use of the same port., was simply a consequence of France's exemption from the freedom to provide services along its coast until 1999.413
The ECJ rejected the French argument that the rules concerning the freedom to provide services be assessed separately
for each of the two types of routes.4 1 4 The ECJ held that the
provision of maritime services between Member States cannot be
subject to rules stricter than the rules governing provision of
analogous services at a domestic level.41 5 The ECJ further stated
that Regulation 3577/92 concerned only the access to maritime
cabotage by providers of services from other Member States and
did not lay down rules governing intra-Community maritime
transport.4 1 6 France's temporary exemption from the requirements of the Regulation was therefore irrelevant.41 7 The ECJ
concluded that the French rules operated as a scheme of
charges treating providers of services from other Member States
less favorably than national operators and that France thus failed
to fulfill its obligations under Regulation 4055/86.418
b. Member State Implementation
As of June 1997, cabotage restrictions were in force in
France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain,4 19 in accordance with
the derogations granted under Article 6(1) of the Regulation.4 2 °
7, 8, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 500-01.
413. Id. at 1-5166-67,
17, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 502 (em414. See Re PortDues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5169,
phasizing need to assess both types of services under equal requirements). The ECJ
held that the achievement of the single market precluded the application of any national legislation which "has the effect of making the provision of services between
Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member
State." Id.
415. Id. at 1-5169,
18, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 502.
416. See id. at 1-5169, 119, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 502 (asserting that Member State's
temporary exemption from implementing Regulation 3577/92 "is without relevance"
with respect to uniform application of Community rules both to provision of services
between Member States and within single Member State).
417. Id. The ECJ held, "[t]o accept that the Member States might on ... [the]
ground [of temporary derogation from the requirements of Regulation 3577/92] be
justified in charging intra-Community maritime transport more heavily than internal
transport would be tantamount to rendering the extension of the freedom to provide
services to intra-Community maritime transport provided for in Regulation 4055/86 to
20, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 502.
a substantial extent nugatory." Id. at 1-5169-70,
418. Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5170-71, 1 24, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 503.
419. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, Annex I, at 2834 tbl.A.1 (overviewing cabotage restrictions in Member States).
420. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6(1), O.J. L 364/7, at 9 (1992)
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Germany restricted access to cabotage services to EU registered
or owned vessels. 42 1 No restrictions applied in any of the remaining Member States because some Member States traditionally follow an open coast-line policy, 422 some Member States enacted legislation for implementing Regulation 3577/92,423 and,
finally, because maritime cabotage is not relevant in certain
Member States.4 24 Thus, both mainland and island cabotage
have been completely liberalized in Northern Europe, while in
Southern Europe there has been only partial liberalization of
25
4

mainland cabotage.

A study carried out on behalf of the Commission before the
end of 1996 revealed that island cabotage is still a very sensitive
issue in Southern Europe.4 26 The major anxieties concern cabotage related employment in the Mediterranean.4 2 7 Article 3(2)
of Regulation 3577/92 provides that for vessels carrying out is(temporarily exempting maritime transport services in Mediterranean and along coast
of Spain, Portugal, and France from implementing Regulation 3577/92).
421. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, Annex I, at 30
tbl.A.1.
422. See id. at 28-32. Member States traditionally following an open cabotage policy are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Id.
423. Id. at 29, 32. Finland issued an amending Act 1362/94 of 22 December 1994
which abolished restrictions concerning cabotage for EU vessels. Id. at 29. Sweden
liberalized cabotage services to EU vessels by Decree of 1 July 1995 amending Decree
235/1974 on authorization to carry out domestic maritime transport operations. Id. at
5.
424. See id. at 5 (stating that no specific legislation was needed in Luxembourg and
Austria because of irrelevance of cabotage in those Member States); see Commission
Report I, supra note 28, COM (95) 383 Final, at 2 (listing relevant legislative acts
adopted by Member States during 1993-94 period).
425. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 20-24 (looking at overall effect of Regulation 3577/92 on maritime transport services in mainland
and island cabotage within Community). The liberalized segment of the market in the
Mediterranean countries was restricted to mainland cargo cabotage with vessels over
650 gt, which represents 18 million tons of a total Southern cabotage market of 133
million tons. Id. at 12. Mainland cruises were liberalized after January 1995, but this
was "a theoretical without practical consequences since all cruise programmes include
at least one island destination." Id. at 12. Restriction on island cabotage and mainland
passenger operations will remain in force until January 1999. Id.; see Regulation 3577/
92, supra note 21, art. 6, OJ. L 364/7, at 9 (1986) (exempting island cabotage in Mediterranean and regular passenger and ferry services until January 1, 1999). Island cabotage in Greece, with respect to regular passenger and ferry services, shall be liberalized
by January 1, 2004. Id.
426. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 20 (analyzing effects of liberalization of island cabotage and its anticipated socio-economic impact).
427. Id.
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land cabotage all matters relating to manning shall be the responsibility of the host State. 42 8 Article 3(3), however, specifies
that, from January 1, 1999, flag State4 29 conditions shall govern
manning of cargo vessels over 650 gross tons engaged in island
cabotage services involving a voyage to or from another State.430
The Commission study established that the unions of seafarers in
the Southern Member States fear that changing the manning requirements from host State to flag State would cause great loss of
local employment. 43 ' To complicate matters further, island cabotage services provide an important source of employment in
the South European region.4 32 Seventy percent of the jobs in
island traffic in the Mediterranean region consists of passenger
trades in the form of regular ferry services or island cruise services.4 33 Accordingly, the Commission acknowledged that the
most contentious point with respect to the post-1999 opening up
of island cabotage services in the Southern Member States concerns the carriage of passengers.43 4
In the Northern Member States, where coastal services have
been free and open both in the cargo and passenger sectors, the
Commission found that the practical consequences in each sector have been very different. 4 5 In the United Kingdom, for example, where the cabotage routes have traditionally been completely open,43 6 U.K. registered ships hold a market share of
428. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 3(2), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992)
(setting forth manning conditions for vessels engaged in island cabotage). Host State
means the State in which the vessel is performing maritime transport. Id.
429. See id. art. 3(3), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1992) (defining flag State as "the State in
which the vessel is registered.").
430. Id.
431. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 20 (discussing cabotage related employment in South European Member States). The problem
seems particularly acute in island regions, such as Sicily and Sardinia, where the unemployment rate is very high as compared with the national average. Id. Hence, it would
be very difficult for any seafarers resident in the islands to find alternative employment
there, if made redundant. Id.
432. See id. at 21 (summarizing estimated total number of jobs associated with
South European cabotage activities in 1995). Out of a total of 51,422 seafarers in cabotage trades, 43,570 are engaged in the island sector. Id.
433. Id. at 22. Regular passenger/ferry services comprise 58.4% of all seafarers job
opportunities in the Mediterranean region, while cruise services account for 11.6%. Id.
434. See id. at 24 (summing up trends observed up to present moment and analyzing possible future developments).
435. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 23 (discussing consequences of open coast line policy in Northern Member States).
436. See BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at 42-43 (mentioning
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thirty to fifty percent in the various cargo sub-categories.43 7 By
contrast, passenger cabotage services are entirely carried out
under the national flag.4 3 Likewise, in the other Northern
Member States, nationally owned, crewed, and registered vessels
carry out all passenger island cabotage trade.4 39
The Commission ascertained that the Northern States' experience shows that domestic regular passenger services tend to
remain in the hands of national carriers, even if the market is
open and free for many years.4 40 In the Commission's opinion,
the most likely explanation for the dominance of domestic carriers in free cabotage trades in Northern Europe is that it is not
financially attractive for a newcomer to set up a regular passenger service to Nordic islands in parallel to the existing services of
the traditional national carriers.4 4 1 The Commission furthermore found that domestic passenger ferries in the Northern
States hardly make use of the possibility under their national
laws to employ foreign

44 2

staff.

The Commission study indicates that conditions in the
Southern European islands differ from those in the North.4 4 3 In
the Southern European islands, the demand for coastline transport reaches its peak in the summer when passenger services can
long-standing open coast line policy of United Kingdom); Commission Report I, supra
note 28, COM (95) 383 Final, at 2 (noting free cabotage in United Kingdom even prior
to Regulation 3577/92).
437. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 23 (discussing extent to which national carriers carry out substantial cabotage market). In liquid
bulk, for example, U.K. registered ships hold a market share of 30%, while in dry bulk,
the share is approximately 50%. Id.
438. Id.
439. See id. (stating that domestic flag ships carry out 100% of passenger island
cabotage in Denmark, Germany, Finland, Sweden, and Netherlands). Cabotage passenger trades are important in Denmark and to a lesser extent also in Germany, Finland,
and the Netherlands. See id. at 7 tbl.2 (summarizing cabotage passenger trades in Member States in 1995). Thus, 21.5 million passengers moved in cabotage trades in Denmark in 1995, while in Germany the figure for the same period was 5.5 million. Id. By
comparison, in 1995, 4 million passengers traveled on cabotage routes in Finland, 3.3
million passengers moved in cabotage trades in the Netherlands, and in Sweden the
respective figure was 1.1 million. Id.
440. Id. at 24.
441. See id. (explaining that regular passenger services to Nordic islands carry
modest profit margins).
442. Id. Probably the preference for speakers of the local languages would explain
the preference for national seamen on board domestic ferries. Id.
443. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 24 (comparing regular passenger services market in Northern and Southern Europe).
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be very profitable.4 4 4 The Commission concluded that non-na-

tional providers of services would therefore find it commercially
attractive to set up businesses in parallel to those offered by na4 45
tional carriers.
The Commission study also revealed that a change from
host State to flag State manning rules 4 46 is the main source of
concern to Southern European operators. 447 Their major con-

cern is that Northern European carriers would be allowed to set
up regular passenger services in the Mediterranean while making partial use of cheap third country labor under their flag
State manning provisions. 448 Finally, the Commission concluded
that the special character of the regular passenger services market and the potential socio-economic implications of the forthcoming liberalization would justify the adoption of certain special provisions to counteract a possible disruption of the competition conditions.4 4 9

444. See id. (noting seasonal fluctuations in demand for regular passenger services
to and from islands in Southern Europe).
445. Id. Seafarers unions and ferry operators in Southern Europe expressed concern with respect to the potential increased competition from outside following the
liberalization of island cabotage services in the Mediterranean region. Id.
446. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 3(2)-(3), O.J. L 364/7, at 8 (1986)
(providing for shift of responsibility in regards of manning conditions from host State
to flag State after January 1, 1999).
447. See Commission Report II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 24 (discussing response by Southern seafarers to forthcoming liberalization of island cabotage
market).
448. Id. The situation seems less sensitive with respect to island cargo trades. See
id. at 24-25 (explaining that only 30% of all seamen employed in Southern island cabotage work in cargo trades sector).
449. See id. at 25-26 (expressing Commission's belief that amending Article 3 of
Regulation 3577/92 would allow for maintaining competition conditions on passenger
services market after full implementation of Regulation 3577/92). The Commission
proposed amending Article 3 of Regulation 3577/92 so that the flag State manning
conditions apply in principle to all cabotage passenger services while permitting the
host State to require that, in the case of passenger services, the host State rules concerning the proportion of EU nationals in the crew shall apply. Id.
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III. IN ADOPTING A TWO-STAGE COMMON MARITIME
POLICY, WITH A GRADUAL LIBERALIZATION OF
CABOTA GE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TOOK THE RIGHT COURSE OF
ACTION IN VIEW OF THE PREVAILING INTERNAL AND
INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS OF THE MARITIME MARKET
In adopting a two-stage common maritime policy, with a
gradual liberalization of cabotage, the European Community acted in the Community's best interests in view of the prevailing
internal and international conditions of the maritime market.
Because maritime transport is closely connected with international trade, shipping is a truly international industry.4 50 Due to
its international character, maritime transport tends to be subject to international agreements, regulations and trends, more
than other types of transport.4 " 1 The EC long-term commercial
and strategic interests dictate the maintenance of a strong, competitive and growing merchant fleet. 452 A successful common
maritime policy will enable the European Community to respond to existing internal and external exigencies, without compromising the major objective of establishing a common maritime market founded on the rules of open trade and fair competition.4 5 By establishing greater coordination between Member
States, an effective EC maritime policy will also improve the
Community's ability to provide shipping services and to secure
access to the world shipping market.4 5 4 Finally, an effective maritime policy is necessary to enable the Community to promote
fair trade and competition in the world maritime industry while
finding the proper balance between the interests of developing
countries and the preservation of a distortion-free competitive
world shipping market.4 5 5 By adopting the 1986 Legislative
450. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing international nature of
shipping industry).
451. See supra notes 71, 205-06 and accompanying text (referring to long history of
international agreements and treaties regulating maritime transport).
452. See supra notes 4, 7, 16, 265 and accompanying text (emphasizing importance
of maritime transport and competitive fleet for EC economy).
453. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing need for EC common
maritime policy).
454. See supra notes 204, 269-73 and accompanying text (analyzing objectives of EC
common maritime policy).
455. See supra notes 269-73, 278 and accompanying text (discussing aims and pur-
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Package45 6 and Regulation 3577/92417 the European Community acted in the Community's best interests in view of the international and internal conditions on the maritime market, and
the need for EC common maritime policy.
A. The 1986 Legislative Package Focused on the Most Urgent Issues
Concerning the Forging of a Common Maritime Policy
No real progress would have been made toward achieving
the goal of a common maritime market if in adopting the 1986
Legislative Package the Council had focused entirely on the removal of barriers to intra-Community shipping services, or had
insisted on adopting the 1985 Commission proposal program in
its entirety.4 5 8 Protectionist practices by non-Member States
were making it difficult to maintain free competition in an open
market.4 59 In-addition, the continuing recession in the shipping
industry coupled with the decline of EC vessels' share of the
world fleet, 4 60 necessitated the adoption of a coherent and tradeoriented maritime policy.4 6 1 Against this background the Council correctly set the free and nondiscriminatory access to the
world maritime market for EC shipowners on the basis of open
trade and fair competition as an immediate priority.
pose of EC maritime policy in relation to existing conditions on world maritime market).
456. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (presenting legislative acts comprising 1986 Legislative Package).
457. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, O.J. L 364/7 (1992) (applying principle of freedom to provide services to sea transport within Member States).
458. See supra notes 272, 292 and accompanying text (discussing Commission proposals contained in 1985 Commission Progress Report, COM (85) 90 Final). The original proposal package by the Commission contained draft regulations on all aspects of
intra-Community maritime transport as well as services to and from third countries. See
supra note 292 (detailing draft Council Regulations that Commission proposed).
459. See Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, pmbl., OJ. L 378/1, at 1 (1986) (discussing growing danger to EC interests posed by protectionist practices by third countries).
460. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (detailing general shipping recession in 1970s and 1980s, and decline of EC maritime industry in comparison with
maritime industries of developing countries during same period).
461. See 1985 Commission Progress Report, supra note 216, COM (85) 90 Final, at
1-10 (assessing world maritime market and Community's position on world maritime
market, along with appropriate goals towards coherent Community maritime policy).
See also Council Regulation 4057/86, supra note 24, pmbl., O.J. L 378/14, at 14 (1986)
(discussing need for Community countermeasures to prevent unfair pricing practices
by third countries); supra note 278 and accompanying text (analyzing preamble to Regulation 4057/86).
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1. The 1986 Legislative Package Came in Response to
International Pressures Adversely Affecting
Community Shipping Interests
Historically, international trade developed out of the transport services between a metropolitan country and a colony for
the purpose of expanding the commercial exchange between
colony and metropolis.4 6 2 Consequently, the maritime services
of the metropolitan country inevitably gained a dominant position.4 63 The political liberation of the former colonies did not
change the dominant position of the metropolitan countries on
the maritime market. 4 64 Because of the close ties between shipping and international trade, a developed maritime industry is of
vital importance for the economic and political integration of
the developing countries into the world economy. 465 As a result,
developing countries consistently adopted a policy of subsidizing
and protecting their newly created national fleets in the postWorld War II period.4 66 The signing of the U.N. Liner Code4 6 7
in 1974468 played a major role in the redistribution of available
cargoes in international shipping.4 6 9 The cargo-sharing provisions4 70 of the U.N. Liner Code make it essentially discriminatory and protectionist in nature.4 7 1 Under these conditions, it
was important for the Community to adopt a common position
in relation to the U.N. Liner Code. 4 72 By committing the EC
462. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (relating history of international trade and development of international trade out of shipping services between
metropolitan countries and their colonies).
463. Id.
464. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing developing countries'
weak position on maritime market in 1950s and 1960s).
465. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (noting importance of national
fleets for economic strength of developing countries).
466. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text (analyzing emergence of protectionist maritime policies by developing countries).
467. U.N. Liner Code, supra note 110.
468. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing signing of U.N. Liner
Code).
469. See supra notes 110, 112, 172-73 and accompanying text (examining cargosharing provisions of U.N. Liner Code).
470. See supra notes 110, 112, 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing often
quoted "40-40-20" formula of U.N. Liner Codes's cargo-sharing provisions).
471. See supra notes 111, 113 and accompanying text (noting opposition to U.N.
Liner Code by developed maritime countries because of U.N. Liner Code's protectionist nature).
472. See supra notes 118, 121 and accompanying text (focusing on Community's
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Member States to the U.N. Liner Code,473 on the one hand, and
setting down rules to govern the Member States's relation with
third countries pursuant to the Community's obligations under
the U.N. Liner Code,4 7 4 on the other, the EC sought to find the
middle ground between the stabilizing effect of liner conferences and its commitment to a policy of free and fair competition.4 75 In this way, by finding the proper balance between participating in the international maritime cooperation process
while at the same time promoting open market and free competition policies,4 7 6 the European Community acted in the Community's best interests. Addressing the issues relating to maritime trade between Member States and third countries properly
constituted a priority interest in view of the world maritime conditions prevailing in the mid-eighties. Regulating the relations
with third countries was necessary to secure the Community mar4 77
itime 'industry vital free access to the world shipping market.
2. By Leaving the Issue of Cabotage out of the 1986
Legislative Package, the European Community
Secured the Adoption of Important Policy
Decisions with Respect to Maritime
Trade with Third Countries
Deliberations in the Council leading to the adoption of the
response to U.N. Liner Code and U.N. Liner Code's consequences for EC maritime
policy).
473. See Regulation 954/79, supra note 110, O.J. L 121/1 (1979) (committing
Member States to U.N. Liner Code); supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Regulation 954/79).
474. See Council Regulation 4055/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/1 (1986) (applying
principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States
and third countries and laying down rules for gradual phasing out of existing cargosharing agreements); supra notes 300-01, 303-05 and accompanying text (detailing provisions of Regulation 4055/86).
475. See Council Regulation 4056/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/4 (1986) (granting
block exemptions to liner conferences); supra notes 325, 329-34 and accompanying text
(explaining block exemptions and examining purpose and language of Regulation
4056/86).
476. See Regulation 4057/86, supra note 24, O.J. L 378/14 (1986) (aimed at restricting unfair pricing practices in international shipping); Regulation 4058, supra note
24, O.J. L 378/21 (1986) (providing for Member States' coordinated action to secure
free access to cargoes in ocean trades); supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text (analyzing Regulation 4057/86); supra notes 342-48 and accompanying text (detailing provisions of Regulation 4058/86).
477. See supra notes 272-73 (discussing EC dependence on world trade and on
need to focus on international aspects of EC maritime policy).
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1986 Legislative Package revealed great divergence of opinion
among the then twelve Member States concerning the opening
up of cabotage services."' Many Member States have long traditions as maritime nations which influence their attitudes toward
shipping.4 79 Member States therefore have traditionally attributed varying degrees of importance to the reservation of coastal
services for their own national maritime operators.4 80 The deliberations in Council made it clear that the opposing positions of
the Northern and Southern Member States on the liberalization
of cabotage routes would make a compromise difficult to reach,
at least not before further careful examination of the conflicting
views and the socio-economic realities behind them.4 8 ' The conflict between the Northern and Southern Member States on cabotage could indefinitely delay the adoption of the remaining
proposals contained in the 1995 Commission Progress Report,
which laid down the foundations of a common external mari482
time policy.
By splitting the proposals put forward by the Commission
into external and internal sub-parts,48 3 and adopting the regulations concerning trading relations with third countries,4 8 4 the
Council acted most expediently under the circumstances. This
move made possible the adoption of the 1986 Legislative Package which marked the first phase of a common maritime policy. 48 5 With the prospect of successfully fostering a competitive
EC fleet in a non-protectionist open world market, the Community could now better concentrate on the problem of removing
478. See supra notes 309-11, 313-19, 321 and accompanying text (discussing in detail legislative history of 1986 Legislative Package and presenting opinions expressed by
Member States during Council deliberations leading to 1986 Legislative Package).
479. See Commission Communication II, supra note 10, COM (96) 81 Final, Annex
B, at 8 (referring to long history of maritime traditions in most Member States).
480. See supra notes 157, 165-67, 317 and accompanying text (reviewing policies
with respect to cabotage restrictions Member States traditionally follow).
481. See supra notes 309-11, 313-23 and accompanying text (detailing proceedings
of Council's meetings in 1985).
482. See supra notes 310, 314, 323 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between Northern and Southern Member States and inability of Council to break deadlock in deliberations on issue of cabotage).
483. See supra notes 278, 294-297 and accompanying text (examining focus of 1986
Legislative Package).
484. Id.
485. See supra notes 25, 350 and accompanying text (assessing impact of 1986 pack-
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internal barriers to a fully open common shipping policy.' 8 6
B. In Introducing a GradualLiberalization of Cabotage Services,
Regulation 3577/92 Found the Best Common Groundfor a
Compromise Between the Positions of Northern
and Southern Member States
Regulation 3577/92487 was the outcome of years of discussion and it represents a delicate compromise between the positions of Northern and Southern Member States.48 8 Member
States have imposed cabotage restrictions in response to various
historical and geographical conditions. 4" For example, the
existence of an extremely long coastline in Italy, or of a complex
archipelago structure with scattered islands, in the case of
Greece, explain the importance of restricting coastal trades to
ships flying the national flag in these countries.4 9 ° On the other
hand, the contours and geographical properties of the Belgian
coast may be the reason behind Belgium's traditionally open
coastal trade and lack of cabotage restrictions. 49 1 A staunch opponent to liberalization initially, Greece was also concerned
about its national defense because a number of its islands are
situated in immediate proximity to Turkey, with which relations
have not always been good.4 9 2
In view of the conflicting approaches by the Northern and
Southern Member States to lifting the restrictions on the Com486. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text (discussing background to
adoption of Regulation 3577/92, which applied freedom to provide services to cabotage); Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, O.J. L 364/7 (1992).
487. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, O.J. L 364/7 (1992).
488. See Commission Report I, supra note 28, COM (95) 383 Final, at 1 (mentioning difficulty in reaching agreement on maritime cabotage); supra notes 28-29, 310-11,
313-17, 323 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting positions of Northern and
Southern Member States regarding liberalization of cabotage).
489. See supra notes 157, 165-67, 311, 317 and accompanying text (examining purpose and motivation for cabotage restrictions).
490. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (discussing Member States' reasons
for opposing liberalization of cabotage).
491. See supra notes 165, 317 and accompanying text (presenting connection between country's geography and policy on cabotage). Most of Belgium's transport between its ports is done by land. BREDIMA-SAvoPOULOU & TZOANNOS, supra note 3, at
158.
492. See supra notes 166, 311 and accompanying text (discussing Greece's response
to proposal for opening up cabotage trades).
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munity's coastal trade,49 particularly concerning island cabotage, the optimal approach to the problem was the adoption of a
gradual phasing out of the existing restrictions, taking into account the local socio-economic conditions in each Member
State.4 9 4 In that sense then the provisions of Article 6 of Regula-

tion 3577/92, setting down a timetable for cabotage liberalization by sector and by region until 2004, 495 offered an acceptable
compromise between the positions of the Northern and South-

ern Member States. By giving the Mediterranean countries until
January 1, 1999,496 and in the case of Greece, until 2004,4 17 to
open up completely their regular coastal passenger and ferry
services,49 8 Regulation 3577/92 reflected the differing socio-eco-

nomic conditions and importance of maritime cabotage in the
Northern and Southern Member States. At the same time Regulation 3577/92 outlined a definite program for the Southern
countries to follow toward a genuine single maritime market.
Furthermore, the ECJ has narrowly interpreted the temporary
exemptions from the implementation of Regulation 3577/92. 499
The Community has moreover adopted a flexible approach
493. See supra notes 314-23 and accompanying text (reviewing opposing positions
of Northern and Southern Member States on issue of cabotage).
494. See supra notes 383-88 and accompanying text (describing provisions of Regulation 3577/92, which allows for gradual lifting of restrictions on cabotage routes).
495. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6, O.J. L 364/92, at 9 (1992) (providing for temporary exemptions from implementation of Regulation 3577/92). Article 6(1) of Regulation 3577/92 states:
By way of derogation, the following maritime transport services carried out in
the Mediterranean and along the coast of Spain, Portugal and France shall be
temporarily exempted from the implementation of this Regulation:
- cruise services, until 1 January 1995,
- transport of strategic goods (oil, oil products and drinking water), until 1
January 1997...
- regular passenger and ferry services, until 1 January 1999.
Id.; see supra notes 387-88 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of Regulation
3577/92).
496. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6, O.J. L 364/92, at 9 (1992) (setting forth temporary derogations from requirements of Regulation 3577/92); supra
notes 387-88, 495 and accompanying text (detailing provisions of Article 6 of Regulation 3577/92).
497. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6(3) of Regulation 3577/92 granting Greece special exemption from implementation of Regulation
3577/92).
498. Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 6(1), O.J. L 364/92, at 9 (1992).
499. See Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. at 1-5169-70,
20, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. at 502
(ruling that temporary exemption from requirements of Regulation 3577/92 does not
permit Member State to apply national rules in contravention of principle of free provi-
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to the ongoing implementation of Regulation 3577/92, based
on constant consultation and cooperation among all Member
States and Community institutions. 0 For example, having studied the effects of the implementation of the Regulation until the
early 1996, the Commission reported that the most sensitive, issue remained the liberalization of regular passenger and ferry
services in island cabotage.5 0 1 The primary source of anxiety is
the change from host-State 50 2 to flag-State5 0 3 manning conditions on the vessels providing cabotage services after January 1,
1999, according to the provisions of Article 3 of Regulation
3577/92.504 The Southern seafarers fear that competition conditions will be distorted by opening up the passenger services in
the region to Northern shipowners employing cheap third-world
labor.50 5 Analyzing the situation, the Commission concluded
that the need for further unification of the Member States
around a common maritime policy and the full implementation
of Regulation 3577/92 dictated taking notice of the concerns of

sion of services in intra-Community maritime transport); supra notes 400-17 (detailing
ECJ's holding in Re Port Dues, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5145, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 485).
500. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 10 , O.J. L. 364/7, at 9 (1992)
(providing that every two years Commission shall present to Council report on implementation of Regulation 3577/92, and that "the Commission shall put forward any necessary proposals."). In accordance with these provisions, the Commission has submitted two reports, the second one of which also included an in depth examination of the
economic and social impact of the liberalization of island cabotage, as required by Article 3(3) of Regulation 3577/92. See supra notes 419-49 and accompanying text (focusing on two Commission reports to Council on implementation of Regulation 3577/92).
501. See supra notes 426-33 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's findings on implementation of Regulation 3577/92 and on socio-economic impact of liberalization of island cabotage).
502. See id. (examining major concerns with respect to forthcoming liberalization
of island cabotage); supra note 428 and accompanying text (defining host-State).
503. See supra note 429 and accompanying text (defining flag-State).
504. See Regulation 3577/92, supra note 21, art. 3(3), OJ. L 364/7, at 8 (1992)
(stating that from January 1, 1999, for vessels carrying out island cabotage "when the
voyage concerned follows or precedes a voyage to or from another State, all matters
relating to manning shall be the responsibility of the" flag state); supra note 446 and
accompanying text (examining Article 3(2)-(3) of Regulation 3577/92).
505. See supra note 445 and accompanying text (discussing Southern seafarers' major concern regarding forthcoming island cabotage liberalization); Commission Report
II, supra note 29, COM (97) 296 Final, at 24 (reporting that South European seafarers
considered "it . . .unfair if North European carriers were allowed to set up regular
passenger services in Southern Europe making partial use of cheap third country labor,
as is allowed... under their flag State manning provisions.").
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the Mediterranean seafarers.50 6 The Commission has correspondingly proposed an amendment to Article 3 of Regulation
3577/92.507 The Commission's analysis of the prevailing conditions in the EC maritime market and the proposed amendment
to Regulation 3577/92 serve as a fine example of the flexible
approach of the Community toward removing all barriers to the
free provision of maritime services in the Community.
CONCLUSION
As part of the attainment of the internal market, the European Community has forged a common maritime policy. Maritime trade between Member States and between Member States
and third countries has been fully liberalized. Liberalization of
cabotage trade, including the troublesome sector of domestic
passenger services, commenced in 1993 and will be completed
within the next decade. In its external policy in maritime transport, the EC has sought to secure free access and fair competition throughout the world maritime market. The EC maritime
policy has aimed at fostering a competitive Community fleet. At
the same time it has sought to provide measures to counter unfair competition and protectionist policies. Notably, the European Community has managed to steer middle ground in its relations with non-Member States by balancing Community shipping interests against the needs of developing countries in an
atmosphere of continued cooperation and consultation.

506. See supra note 449 and accompanying text (presenting Commission's response to findings of Commission study).
507. See id. (discussing Commission's proposal for amending Article 3 of Regulation 3577/92).

